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PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE: THE 
SHARED AIMS AND OCCASIONAL CONFLICTS OF 
LEGITIMACY AND MORAL CREDIBILITY 
Josh Bowers"' 
Paul H. Rob insun ** 
INTRODUCTION 
A growing literature suggests that a criminal justice system 
derives practical value by generating societal perceptions of fair 
enforcement and adjudication. 1 Specifically, perceptions of 
procedural fairness-resulting in perceptions of the system's 
"legitimacy," as the term is used-may promote systemic compliance 
with substantive law, cooperation with legal institutions and actors, 
and deference to even unfavorable outcomes.2 A separate literature 
suggests that a criminal justice system derives practical value by 
distributing criminal liability and punishment according to 
principles that track societal intuitions of justice.3 Specifically, 
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1. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDUHAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); TOM R. 'I'YLEH, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 
(2006) [hereinafter TYLER, WPOL]; TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE 
LAW (2002) [hereinafter TYLER & Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW]; Jonathan D. Casper, 
Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & Soc'Y 
REV. 483 (1988); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice 
and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Pohcing, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 
513 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule 
of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST.: REV. RES. 283 [hereinafter Tyler, Effective Rule of 
Law]; Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 
57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006) (reviewing the literature on legitimacy); Tom 
R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public 
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account 
when Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707 (2000); Tom R. 
Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the 
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHio ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008). 
2. See infra Part liLA. 
3. See e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: 
WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED How MUCH? 135-212, 231-60 (2008) [hereinafter 
ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES]; Laura I. Appleman, Sentencing, 
Empirical Desert, and Restorative Justice, in CRIMINAL LAw COl\'VERSATIONS 59 
(Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009); Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and 
Peculiarly) American "Revolution in Punishment Theory," 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113 
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perceptions of substantive ju~:;tice-resulting in perceptions of the 
system's "moral credibility"-would seem to promote compliance, 
cooperation, and deference. By contrast, a criminal justice system 
perceived to be procedurally unfair or substantively unjust may 
provoke resistance and subversion, and may lose its capacity to 
harness powerful social and normative influence.4 
This Article examines the shared aims and overlaps in 
operation and effect of these two criminal justice dynamics-the 
"legitimacy" that derives from fair adjudication and professional 
enforcement and the "moral credibility" that derives from just 
results-as well as the occasional potential for conflict. Specifically, 
in this Article, we aim to isolate and define the parameters of each 
dynamic, to compare and examine their similarities and differences, 
and to explore the settings in which the two run together or (more 
rarely) cross-wise. In this way, our overarching objective is to clear 
the air. To date, legal scholars have tended to invoke the two 
dynamics too casually, to ignore one but not the other, or to conflatc 
or confuse the two. Thus, we intend to provide something of a 
primer: a useful and necessary analytic framework for ongoing 
debates into the advantages, limits, and dangers of moral credibility 
and legitimacy. But we do not stop there. We stake out tentative 
positions within these debates. That is, we endorse the prevailing 
view that moral credibility and legitimacy are promising-indeed, 
critical-systemic enterprises, and we make a number of tentative 
claims about when and to what degree a system ought to pursue or 
prioritize each enterprise. Particularly, we anticipate significant 
(2010); Michael T. Cahill, A Fertile Desert?, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, 
supra, at 43; Zachary R. Calo, Empirical Desert and the Moral Economy of 
Punishment, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1123 (2010); Adil Ahmad Haque, Legitimacy as 
Strategy, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra, at 57; Joseph E. Kennedy, 
Empirical Desert and the Endpoints of Punishment, in CRIMINAL LAw 
CONVERSATIONS, supra, at 54; Adam Kolber, Compliance-Promoting Intuitions, 
in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra, at 41; Youngjae Lee, Desert, 
Deontology, and Vengeance, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1141 (2010); Matthew Lister, 
Desert: Empirical, Not 1\lletaphysical, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra, 
at 51; Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Lay Person 
Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839 
(2000) [hereinafter Robim;on, Normative Crime Control]; Alice Ristroph, Third 
Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151 (2010); Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey 
P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1940 (2010); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: 
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007) 
[hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice1; Paul H. Robinson & John 
M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997) [hereinafter 
Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert]; Mary Sigler, The Methodology of Desert, 
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1173 (2010); Christopher Slobogin, Some Hypotheses About 
Empirical Desert, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1189 (2010); Andrew E. Tashtz, Empirical 
Desert: The Yin and Yang of Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL LAW CoNVERSATIONS, 
supra, at 56. 
4. See infra Part III.B. 
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crime-control advantages for a system that enjoys perceptions of 
both moral credibility and legitimacy, but we conclude that-for 
empirical and theoretical reasons-moral credibility ought to be the 
principal objective in uncommon circumstances in which a system 
may effectively pursue only one. 
In Part I, we explore the shared aims of legitimacy and moral 
credibility. In Part II, we discuss the practices, procedures, and 
rules that produce, undermine, or implicate perceptions of 
procedural fairness and substantive justice, and we identify 
potential pitfalls and dangers for a criminal justice system 
committed to generating perceptions of fairness and justice. In Part 
III, we confront the critical question of whether perceptions of 
fai1·ness and justice effectively promote deference to law and legal 
authorities and institutions. In Part IV, we attempt to explain why 
a criminal justice system may come to adopt and implement 
practices, standards, and rules that deviate from societal 
perceptions of fairness and justice. Finally, in Part V, we examine 
the interesting issues raised when legitimacy and moral credibility 
conflict with one another, and we sketch our vision for how a system 
ought to resolve the tension. 
L THE SHARED AIMS OF LEGITIMACY AND MORAL CREDIBILITY 
A. Legitimacy 
In law, as in life, legitimacy is a term invoked so casually that it 
sometimes seems to signify little more than a vague aspiration. 
However, -in the criminal-justice context, the term has come to 
represent something more precise. Criminologists, social 
psychologists, and political scientists have refined the concept to 
mean a "belief that legal authorities are entitled to be obeyed and 
that the individual ought to defer to their judgments."5 In this 
Article, we focus principally on the work of Tom Tyler, not because 
he is a leading legitimacy theorist and empirical researcher, but 
because over the past two decades his work has generated the most 
attention in the legal academy, and we are particularly concerned 
with the ways in which legal scholars have, to date, used (and 
misused) his contributions. 
Tyler has argued persuasively that the law's legitimacy (or at 
least a perception of it) is critical to a well-functioning criminal 
justice system and to public safety more generally. Specifically, 
effective crime control depends on volitional deference to substantive 
law and to its enforcement and adjudication. And, significantly, 
perceptions of procedural fairness may well facilitate such 
deference. The importance of the legitimacy project cannot, 
therefore, be oversold. It is a terrifically promising enterprise that 
5. TYLER & HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 1, at xiv. 
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may serve to promote the very goals that are (and ought to be) 
central to criminal justice: compliance with statutory law and 
cooperation with legal authorities and institutions. 
Procedure is legitimacy's starting point.6 People come to obey 
the law and cooperate with legal authorities because they perceive 
their institutions to operate fairly. In this way, perceptions of 
procedural fairness facilitate a kind of normative, as opposed to 
purely instrumental, crime control.7 Put differently, citizens of a 
procedurally just state comport their behavior to the substantive 
dictates of the law not because the state exercises coercive power (or, 
at least, not exclusively because of it), but because they feel a 
normative commitment to the state. Unlike conventional deterrence 
theory, which presumes the necessity of carrots and sticks, 
legitimacy harnesses the power of internal commitment and 
volitional participation.R Legitimacy replaces the Holmesian "bad 
man" with the "faithful man"-an individual who complies with the 
law not because he rationally calculates that it is in his best interest 
to do so but because he sees himself as a moral actor who divines 
that it is right to defer to legitimate authority.9 
Critically, perceptions of procedural fairness are outcome 
independent. 1D In other words, a defendant or victim need not 
realize her objective in order to conclude that enforcement or 
adjudicatory practices are legitimate. Likewise, an ordinary citizen 
need not determine that the law expresses her personal notion of 
morality in order to accept its validity. In this way, procedural 
fa-irness differs from outcome-driven normative and psychological 
approaches to criminal justice (like distributive justice generally and 
moral credibility specifically) that examine whether the law 
6. See Tyler, Effective Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 286 (indicating that 
"issues of process dominate public evaluations of the police, the courts, and 
social regulatory activities"). 
7. See TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 3 (contrasting the normative 
perspective on why people follow the law with the instrumental perspective, 
which relies on incentives and penalties to shape behavior); Robinson, 
Normative Crime Control, supra note 3, at 1861-69. 
8. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that the person who is 
normatively committed to obeying the law will do so "irrespective of whether 
they risk punishment for breaking the law"); Tom Tyler, Psychology and 
Institutional Design, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 801, 801-08, 813-16 (2008). 
9. See TYLER & Huo, TRUST IN THE LAw, supra note 1, at xiv ("This belief is 
distinguished from the view that it is in one's self-interest to accept those 
judgments. Individuals with strong beliefs in the legitimacy of the police and 
the courts are more inclined to self·regulation; they take personal responsibility 
for following laws, accept the decisions of legal authorities, and are more likely 
to defer voluntarily to individual police officers and judges."). 
10. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 5 ("[J]ustice concerns are seen as acting 
independently of the influence of an outcome's favorability."); Tyler & Fagan, 
supra note 1, at 240-41 ("Studies ... find that procedures are judged against 
ethical criterion of their appropriateness that are distinct from the favorability 
or fairness of the outcomes of such procedures."). 
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produces results that accord with communal intuitions of just 
deserts.ll Because the concept of procedural fairness is not 
dependent upon piecemeal review of substantive outcomes, positive 
or negative perceptions possess significant potential to motivate or 
undermine deference to power, thus transferring broad discretionary 
authority to the state.l 2 In this way, legitimacy may produce 
compliance and cooperation with not just an immediate enforcement 
effort but across codes and cases, and even actors and institutions.l3 
Thus, for legal authorities, cultivating perceptions of legitimacy is of 
particularly useful and flexible value.l4 
But what does the public perceive to be legitimate procedures 
and practices? What minimum standards are shared across 
demographics and cultures? We can provide no definitive answers 
to these questions in this space. Nevertheless, a fair consensus has 
developed over the principal criteria that typify procedural fairness. 
Legitimacy may be measured by the quality of decision making or 
the quality of treatment of defendants.15 More specifically, 
procedures are legitimate when they are neutral, accurate, 
consistent, trustworthy, and fair-when they provide opportunities 
11 See generally Michael D. Reisig ct al., The Construct Validity and 
Refinement of Process-Based Policing Measures, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005 
(2007). 
12. See TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 4 (''Although both morality and 
legitimacy are normative, they are not identical. Leaders are especially 
interested in having legitimacy in the eyes of their followers, because legitimacy 
most effectively provides them with discretionary authority that they can use in 
governing."); Tyler & Darley, supra note 1, at 72~-24. 
13. See TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 29; Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and 
Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 
319-24 (2009). 
14. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 1, at 709-23. 
15. See, e.g., Reisig et al., supra note 11, at 1006; Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. 
Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of 
Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253, 277 (2004). In 
numerous articles, Tom Tyler, Allan Lind, and Yuen Huo have found 
remarkable consistency across cultures and demographic groups in the criteria 
used to define fair procedures. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind, Yuen J. Huo & Tom R. 
Tyler, ... And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute 
Resolution Procedures, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1994); E. Allan Lind, Tom 
R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in the 
Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 767 (1997); Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of 
Fair Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAw & 
Soc'y REV. 809 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of 
Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 983 
(2000); Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: lfhat 
Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal 
Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (2001); Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural 
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 103 (1988) [hereinafter Tyler, lfhat is Procedural Justice?]. 
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for error correction and for interested parties to be heard. 1 fi Legal 
authorities are legitimate when they act impartially, honestly, 
transparently, respectfully, ethically, and equitably.17 The criminal 
justice system that optimally expresses these values is not only 
morally defensible but also quite probably stable and effective. 
B. Moral Credibility 
It has long been assumed that in determining how to distribute 
punishment-how much to whom?-the goals of doing justice and 
fighting crime inevitably conflict. The traditional crime-control 
principles of deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation of the 
dangerous would distribute criminal liability and punishment in 
ways quite different from the distributive principle of moral desert. 
Retributivists and utilitarian crime-control advocates commonly saw 
their dispute as irreconcilable, and in a sense it is. However, what 
has been referred to as the "empirical desert" or "moral credibility" 
literature has argued that, in another sense, these two fundamental 
aims of criminal justice may not conflict. Doing justice may be the 
most effective means of fighting crime. 1s 
The hitch is that it is not moral philosophy's deontological 
notion of justice that has crime-control power, but rather the 
community's shared principles of justice, what has been called 
"empirical desert." This turns out to be both good and bad for 
constructing a distributive principle for criminal liability and 
punishment. On the one hand, unlike moral philosophy's 
deontological desert, empirical desert can be readily 
operationalized--its rules and principles can be authoritatively 
determined through social science research into people's shared 
intuitions of justice. On the other hand, people's shared intuitions of 
justice are not justice, in a transcendent sense. People's shared 
intuitions can be wrong. In the end, however, the retributivist may 
find that an instrumentalist distributive principle of empirical 
16. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 7, 117; Casper et al., supra note 1, at 
486; Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of 
''Voice" and Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 108, 108 (1977); Tyler, "What Is Procedural Justice?, supra note 15, at 
129; Tom Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Justice and Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK 
OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 295, 300 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett 
eds., 2004). 
17. See, e.g., JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY, POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE 171 
(2003) (discussing the importance of police respect and concluding that "[p]olice 
respect enhances compliance, and police disrespect diminishes compliance"); 
Casper et al., supra note 1, at 486; Tyler, "What is Procedural Justice?, supra 
note 15, at 129. 
lK See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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desert will produce far more deontological desert than any other 
workable principle that could or would be adopted. 19 
As has been argued elsewhere, the crime-control benefits from 
dit;tributing punishment according to people's shared intuitions of 
justice are thought to arise from a variety of sources.20 Some of the 
system's power to gain compliance derives from its potential to 
stigmatize, which can be a powerful, yet essentially cost-free, control 
mechanism for many offenders. Yet a criminal law can stigmatize 
only if it has earned moral credibility with the community it 
governs. That is, for conviction to trigger community stigmatization, 
the law must have earned a reputation with the community for 
accurately reflecting the community's views on what deserves moral 
condemnation. A criminal law with liability and punishment rules 
that conflict with a community's shared intuitions of justice will 
undermine its moral credibility. 
Another value of moral credibility comes from the fact that 
effective operation of a criminal justice system depends on the 
cooperation, or at least the acquiescence, of the system's witnesses, 
jurors, police, prosecutors, judges, offenders, and others. To the 
extent that people see the system as in conflict with their judgments 
of justice, that acquiescence and cooperation is likely to fade and be 
replaced with resistance and subversion.z1 Subversion and 
resistance may take the form of either an impulse toward apathy or 
an impulse toward self-help.zz That is, people may turn to 
vigilantism in reaction to a perceived failure of justice. More 
commonly, people may resist or subvert the system in less dramatic 
ways. Witnesses may lose an incentive to offer their information or 
testimony. Citizens may fail to report crimes in the first instance. 
Jurors may disregard their jury instructions. Police officers, 
prosecutors, and judges may make up their own rules. And 
offenders may resist adjudication proces::;es and punishments rather 
than participate in them. 
An even greater power of moral credibility comes through a less 
obvious mechanism. The real power to gain compliance with 
society's rules of conduct lies not in the threat of official sanction but 
rather in the influence of the forces of social and individual moral 
controJ.23 It is the networks of interpersonal relationships, the 
19. See generally Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the 
Competition Between Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MAllY L. 
REV. 1831 (2007). 
20. For a fuller account, sec generally ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 3, at 175-210; Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 3; 
Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 3; Robinson et al., 
Disutility of Injustice, supra note 3, at 1995-2025. 
21. Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, 
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 153 (2008). 
22. Id. at 153-54. 
23. Id. at 154. 
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social norms shared among those relationships and transmitted 
through those social networks, and the internalization of those 
norms that control people's conduct. The law is not irrelevant to 
these forces. Criminal law plays a central role in creating and 
maintaining the social consensus nece~sary for sustaining moral 
norms. In a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may be the 
only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and ethnic 
differences.24 Thus, its most important real-world effect may be its 
ability to assist in the building, shaping, and maintaining of these 
norms. It can help build and harness the compliance-producing 
power of interpersonal relationships and personal morality, but only 
if it has earned a reputation for moral credibility with its 
community. A criminal law that has been found to be off the mark 
in its past condemnations and punishments can be simply dismissed 
as just "wrong again." 
The criminal law with moral credibility also can gain deference 
and compliance in the particularly difficult case of borderline or new 
offenses. If the law has earned a reputation as a reliable statement 
of community views, people are more likely to defer to its commands 
as morally authoritative in those borderline cases in which the 
propriety of the conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the 
actor. This can be an important role. In a society with the complex 
interdependencies of ours, seemingly harmless conduct can have 
seriously harmful consequences. When the conduct is criminalized, 
one would want the citizen to respect the law even if he or she does 
not fully understand why it is forbidden. Such deference is more 
likely where citizens have come to see the criminal law as accurate 
in announcing condemnable behavior.25 
The extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in all these 
respects-in harnessing the power of stigmatization, in reducing 
resistance and subversion to a system perceived as unjust, in 
facjlitating, communicating, and maintaining societal norms, and in 
gaining compliance in borderline cases-is to a large extent 
dependent on the degree to which the criminal law has gained moral 
credibility in the minds of the citizens governed by it. If the law 
assigns liability and punishment in ways that the community26 
perceives as consistent with its shared intuitions of justice, it gains 
deference, cooperation, and compliance. If its judgments regularly 
conflict with community views, its work is undermined by those who 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. The :relevant "community" is that to be governed by the contemplated 
liability rule. In the United States, where the governing criminal laws are 
contained primarily in state criminal codes, the relevant community for 
determining a code's rule will be the residents of the state. However, one can 
imagine situations in which the relevant community in shaping the practice, 
procedure or rule is larger (the federal criminal code) or smaller (local court 
sentencing practices). 
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see it as unjust. Recent empirical studies have confirmed these 
effects of a system's moral credibility. The studies suggest that the 
greater the perception that the criminal law's liability and 
punishment rules conflict with a person's own judgments of justice, 
the less likely the person is to respect that criminal law as a moral 
authority and, therefore, the less likely to support, cooperate, and 
comply with that criminallaw.27 
II. SHAPING REPUTATION 
What do we know about public perceptions of the legitimacy of 
police practices and adjudicative procedures? What do we know 
about public perceptions of the moral credibility of liability and 
punishment rules? In this Part, we explore what is understood 
about how criminal justice systems develop reputations for 
legitimacy or moral credibility, and we conclude that-at least when 
it comes to the legitimacy of specific enforcement and adjudication 
practices and procedures-what is understood is not yet enough. 
A. Creating Legitimacy 
By now, scholars have tested legitimacy in a variety of legal 
contexts and even in social settings beyond the law.zs Our analysis 
is limited to a slice of the existing work that relates to two criminal-
justice contexts: what constitutes professional and unprofessional 
enforcement practices, and what constitutes fair and unfair 
adjudicative procedures. Within these narrow domains, scholars 
have done both substantial work and, we think, not quite enough. 
They have examined perceptions of legitimacy among a host of 
subpopulations: suspects, defendants, witnesses, victims, and 
ordinary citizens.29 They have studied procedural fairness in 
27. See infra Part III.B. 
28. See, e.g., Sheldon Alexander & Marian Ruderman, The Role of 
Procedural and Distributive Justice in Organizational Behavior, 1 Soc. JUST. 
RES. 177 (1987); Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Procedural Justice in Resolving 
Family Disputes: A Psychosocial Analysis of Individual and Family Functioning 
in Late Adolescence, 27 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 101 (1998); RebP.cca 
Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: 
Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DJSP. RESOL. 1, 
6-7 (2011); Shelly Jackson & Mark Fondacaro, Procedural Justice in Resolving 
Family Conflict: Implications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 LAw & PoL'Y 101 
(1999); Heather J. Smith et al., The Self-Relevant Implications of the Group-
Value Model: Group Membership, Self- Worth, and Treatment Quality, 34 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYr.HOL. 470 {1998); Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee 
Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-
Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287 (2005). 
29. See, e.g., Casper et al., supra note 1; Michael D. Reisig et al., Suspect 
Disrespect Toward the Police, 21 JUST. Q. 241 (2004); Michael D. Reisig & 
Gorazd Mesko, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Prisoner Misconduct, 15 
PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 41, 41-49 (2009); Tom R. Tyler, "Legitimacy in 
Corrections':· Policy Implications, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. PoL'Y 127 (2010); Tom 
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courthouses, in police precincts, and on police beats. And they have 
consistently found that fair treatment affects attitudes toward legal 
authorities (though fairness may play a greater or lesser role, 
depending on the particular context and circumstancc).30 But 
beyond the most obviously controversial enforcement tactics and 
adjudicatory procedures, surprisingly little is known about which 
practices laypersons perceive to be most professional and 
unprofessional, fair and unfair.31 The gap is especially unfortunate 
because legitimacy has the potential to do its best work at the 
margins. More concretely, public perceptions would seem to hold 
the most sway on otherwise close questions. 
One difficulty is that there is no clear consensus on which 
mechanism or mechanisms lead people to adopt perceptions of 
legitimacy in the first instance. In their seminal early study, John 
Thibaut and Laurens Walker indicated that individuals prefer fair 
procedures because such procedures are ultimately more likely to 
produce just outcomes.32 In short, a fair procedure fosters a greater 
likelihood of a just substantive outcome, even if that favorable 
outcome does not, in fact, come to pass in the immediate case. By 
contrast, Tom Tyler has argued that procedural fairness has 
normative value wholly independent of outcome because legitimate 
practices convey respect for the individual and thereby promote self-
esteem.33 More recently, Kees van den Bos, Allen Lind, and others 
speculated that fair procedures might influence systemil: 
satisfaction by reducing uncertainty.34 In short, the question 1s 
unsettled and is just one of many ripe areas for continued study. 
R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their 
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 51 (1984) (analyzing legitimacy of 
experiences with enforcement and adjudication of traffic offenses). 
30. Compare TYLER & Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 1, at 196 (finding 
that generally "people's main consideration when avaluating the police and the 
courts is the treatment that they feel people receive from those authorities") 
(emphasis added), with Casper ct al., supra note 1, at 494-96 (observing that 
procedural fairness is related to defendant satisfaction even in high-stakes 
felony cases, but also acknowledging that concerns with outcome and 
distributive justice also play significant roles), and Reisig et al., supra note 11, 
at 1024 (finding that procedural fairness is an important, but not exclusive, 
determinant of perceptions of legitimacy). 
31. McCLUSKEY, supra note 17, at 28-29 (observing that the data are 
relatively thin on the precise procedures that generate perceptions oflegitimacy 
or procedural fairness). 
32. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 1, at 4. 
33. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of 
the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 8RO (1989); Tom R. 
Tyler & Allen A Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (Mark. P. Zanna ed., 1992). 
34. Kees van den Bos et al., How Do I Judge My Outcome VVhen I Do Not 
Know the Outcome of Others? The Psychology of the Fair Process Effect, 72 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1034, 1042-45 (1997). 
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Other open questions concern what marks the essentials of 
professional enforcement and fair adjudication, whether some values 
are more essential than others, and whether perceptions of any such 
minimum standards are universal across cultures and experiences 
(and are therefore largely resistant to habituation, education, and 
attempted manipulation). It would seem to us that perceptions of 
procedural fairness are more malleable than intuitions about 
distributive justice. After all, we see striking consistency across 
cultures when it comes to perceptions of the relative severity of 
different types of misconduct.35 By contrast, we see dramatic 
differences in the procedural norms honored by otherwise similar 
liberal Western states.36 
Beyond such rough-and-ready speculation, however, we do not 
attempt to answer these questions. For present purposes, we think 
it enough to review the extant scholarship and highlight certain 
unexplored or underexplored practices and procedures, many of 
which are neither obviously legitimate nor illegitimate, but that 
present potentially fruitful areas for future examination of the 
question. 
1. Fair Enforcement 
Professional policing regulates social behavior through fair 
procedures and practices. As indicated, a fair procedure may consist 
of fair decision making or fair treatment. Specifically, people are 
likelier to perceive police decision making as fair when officers make 
decisions according to readily discernible and generally applicable 
rules, standards, and guidelines. Likewise, people are likelier to 
perceive police treatment as fair when officers behave in manners 
that are trustworthy, equitable, dignified, and respectfu}.37 
Almost certainly, the police lose perceived legitimacy when they 
intentionally or willfully (or even recklessly or negligently) employ 
excessive force. This is a somewhat straightforward issue, and it 
need not detain us long. It goes without saying that, for any number 
of normative and instrumental reasons beyond perceptions of 
legitimacy, police should refrain from the kinds of abuses of power 
made infamous by the beating of Rodney King,38 the killing of 
35. See generall_y Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and 
Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007). 
36. See, e.g., .John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal 
Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978). Nevertheless, Tom 
Tyler and Allan Lind have found that the criteria used to define fair procedures 
are similar across cultures and demographic groups. See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
37. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
PoL. & Soc. Sci., May 2004, at 84, 94-99 (2004). 
38. Hector Tobar & Richard Lee Colvin, Witnesses Depict Relentless 
Beating, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at B1. 
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Arthur McDuffie,39 or the sodomizing of Abner Louima.4o Instances 
of extreme and intentional illegitimate behavior, even if isolated, 
may profoundly impact perceptions of the legitimacy of legal 
authorities because "people are more strongly influenced by negative 
experiences than by positive experiences."41 This asymmetry is not 
terrifically surprising. Individuals-at least those who start out 
believing their institutions are legitimate-anticipate positive 
experiences with authority. Consequently, their positive perceptions 
remain somewhat static following fair treatment but may be 
undercut by even a single instance of unfair treatment. Moreover, 
in the digital age, instances of police· abuse are likelier to be 
recorded and broadcast to a wider audience, as demonstrated 
recently by the negligent homicide of Oscar Grant by a transit 
officer in Oakland, California-a killing that was captured by six 
separate cell-phone video cameras.42 And, of course, such images of 
negative treatment are likelier to be disseminated virally than banal 
images of respectful or pleasant police-citizen encounters. 
More difficult questions arise when police engage in run-of-the-
mill unprofessional practices-when they are brusque, insensitive, 
rude, or dishonest. For instance, police sometimes engage in the 
illegitimate practice of providing doctored testimony or police 
reports to justify arrests, searches, or identification and 
interrogation procedures-the so-called "testilying" phenomenon.43 
More generally, police may behave impolitely, aggressively, or 
dismissively in their day-to-day interactions with civilians. Again, it 
may be enough to say that-for reasons of human decency and 
procedural fairness-police should strive to interact civilly with 
suspects, witnesses, victims, and the general public. But beyond 
such platitudes, the existing literature offers some lessons. First, 
police may undermine perceptions of legitimacy by showing force 
39. Ex-Officer Tells Court of Role in Miami Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
1980, at All (describing fatal beating and cover-up that arose out of alleged 
traffic infraction and subsequent high-speed chase). 
40. Leonard Levitt, The Louima Verdicts, Some Splits, But Blue Wall 
Stands, NEWSDAY, June 9, 1999, at A4. 
41. See TYLER & Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 1, at 39 ("[A]ttitudes 
become more negative following unfavorable experiences but remain the same 
following positive experiences."). 
42. Jesse McKinley, Officer Guilty of Manslaughter in Killing that Inflamed 
Oakland, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at All; see also Seth Mydans, Videotaped 
Beating by Officers Pu.ts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 
1991, at Al. 
43. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF NEW YORK, 
ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS 36 (1994) [hereinafter THR MOLLEN 
REPORT], available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/4%20-
%20Mollen%20Commission%20-%20NYPD.pdf (finding an epidemic of 
"falsifications" by the New York Police Department in the 1990s); I. Bennett 
Capers, Crime, Legitimacy and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 868-71 (2008) 
(discussing the frequency of "testilying"). 
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rather than soliciting consent politely (even in circumstances where 
force is justifiable and where consent is not legally required).44 
Second, isolated incidents of low-level unprofessionalism are likelier 
to influence individuals' attitudes toward the police when the 
contact is citizen-initiated, as opposed to police-initiated.45 Third, 
negative perceptions of unprofessional policing may prove persistent 
enough to affect, in turn, perceptions of prosecutorial practices and 
judicial adjudicative procedures. Specifically, Jonathan Casper 
found that "aspects of police treatment ... spill over onto defendant 
evaluations of their experience with courtroom personnel and their 
general sense of fair treatment."46 
The thorniest questions involve police practices that are merely 
controversial-practices that may be considered procedurally unfair 
from one view, but that also may be defensible from some valid 
alternative perspective or for some valid alternative reason. It is 
especially interesting to consider whether the Supreme Court's 
constitutional acceptance or rejection of these borderline police 
practices aligns with the public's perceptions of procedural fairness. 
By way of example, constitutional criminal procedure questions 
frequently turn on analyses of expectations, understandings, or 
beliefs of the so-called "reasonable man." Yet, the Court has done 
almost no work to determine whether its conceptions of the 
reasonable layperson dovetail with what people actually find fair in 
a given context. For instance, to determine whether police have 
engaged in a search subject to Fourth Amendment inquiry, a court 
must ask whether police have intruded on a defendant's reasonable 
or legitimate expectation of privacy.47 To reach this determination, 
the court must make an evaluative judgment of which activities 
(and in what contexts) a given society at a given time perceives to be 
sufficiently private to merit constitutional protection. But the Court 
provides no empirical bases for its assertions of what constitutes 
reasonable expectations of privacy within communities. The danger 
is that the average person may find the Court's folk psychological 
assessment of the average person's beliefs to be disingenuously 
44. See, e.g., Robin Shepard Engel, Citizens' Perceptions of Distributive and 
Procedural Injustice During Traffic Stops with Police, 42 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 445, 469 (2005) (reporting that when police use force citizens are many 
times more likely to perceive procedural injustice, and concluding that "law 
enforcement officials may need to reconsider their policies guiding the use of 
consent and other types of discretionary searches"); see McCLUSKEY, supra note 
17, at 43-44, 171-72. 
45. Dennis P. Rosenbaum et al., Attitudes Towards the Police: The Effects of 
Direct and Vicarious Experiences, 8 POLICE Q. 343, 358--59 (2005). A possible 
explanation is that individuals who initiate contact with law enforcement do so 
because they hold police in higher esteem and trust police to provide help. Such 
faith may be shaken thereafter by even a single unprofessional encounter. 
46. Casper et al., supra note 1, at 498. 
47. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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cramped or expansive.48 In such circumstances, the public may 
come to perceive unfairness along any of three dimensions. First, 
the public may consider the court to be dishonest, nontransparent, 
or perhaps even biased. Second, the public may take the court to be 
insufficiently sensitive to societal needs for effective law 
enforcement. Third, the public may construe the court to be an 
unaccountable and nonresponsive body that substitutes its own 
preferences for popularly held value judgments. 
To illustrate, the Supreme Court has held that a person has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in her closed trash,49 her bank50 
and telephone records,51 or her real property as viewed aerially.sz 
Conversely, the Court has held that a person possesses a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the heat emanating from her home.53 
These intuitions are not definitively inaccurate. For instance, 
social-science findings indicate that average lay perceptions, in fact, 
appear to align with the Court's determinations54 that police 
implicate no reasonable expectation of privacy by (1) subjecting 
luggage to dog sniffs for contraband, 55 (2) tracking vehicles' 
movements remotely,56 or (3) observing private property from 
hovering helicopters.57 But, when the Court relies on intuitions, it 
runs a sign1ficant risk that those intuitions may be wrong. After all, 
judicial intuitions are just that-divinations of societal expectations 
grounded in no more than a hunch; deductions about what, to use 
Justice Harlan's phrasing, "society is prepared to recognize as 
'reasonable."'5B Thus, it may be that the public agrees that, say, a 
person lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy against everyone 
once she has "knowingly exposed" information to anyone. 59 But it 
48. AP. HBRBER'r, UNCOMMON LAW 4 (1974). 
49. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988). 
50. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
51. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
52. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986). 
53. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001). 
54. SHMUEL LOCK, CRIME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE 
TOLF.RANT PUBLIC 39 (1999) (finding that 91 % of the public approved of the 
Court's limitation on a reasonable expectation of privacy); Christopher Slobogin 
& Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in 
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized 
and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L .• J. 727, 739 (1993) (finding that 
respondents, given fifty hypothetical police practices, ranked aerial observation 
and electronic tracking among less intrusive activities). 
55. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
56. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (permitting remote 
tracking of vehicles). 
fi7. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450--51 (permitting helicopter surveillance). 
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
59. Compare United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (finding that 
an individual "takes the risk, jn revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government"), with RONALD 
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may well be otherwise. Indeed, the few social scientists who have 
studied these questions have found that the public disagrees with 
the Court on at least some Fourth Amendment search questions. 
For instance, one study found that the public perceives the practice 
of allowing police to inspect bank records to be highly intrusive, 
notwithstanding judicial tolerance for the practice.60 
Of course, this concern is not exclusive to constitutional 
questions of what courts and the public perceive to be reasonable 
expectations of privacy. Analogously, in the context of Fourth 
Amendment consent questions, courts ask whether defendants 
reasonably feel free to refuse police requests.6I In the context of 
Fourth Amendment seizure questions, courts ask whether 
defendants reasonably feel free to leave or otherwise end police 
encounters.62 Again and again, in the context of constitutional 
regulation of police conduct, courts take up questions of societal 
perspective without the benefit of empirical guidance. As indicated, 
a given court's intuitions may be right. Indeed, the social science 
J. ALLRN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 378-79 (2d ed. 2005) 
("Though the Court has viewed such 'sharing' [of information] as proof of the 
absence of reasonable privacy expectations, it is not clear that citizens view 
privacy in the same way."), and Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privac.Y and the Fourth 
Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 159~1 (1987) 
("Much of what is important in human life takes place in a situation of shared 
privacy. The important events in our lives are shared with a chosen group of 
others; they do not occur in isolation, nor are they open to the entire world."). 
60. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 54, at 740. We must acknowledge, 
however, that there may be something of a dynamic relationship between court 
decisions and public perceptions. Specifically, one study found that lawyers 
(whose attitudes are more likely shaped by Supreme Court jurisprudence) were 
more tolerant than the public of allowing police to rifle through trash bags left 
outside the home-a practice that, as indicated, the Court freely permits. LOCK, 
supra note 54, at 39 (finding that only 49% of the public approved of the 
practice as compared to 64 % of lawyers); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988). Comparatively, the study found that the public was far 
likelier than lawyers to approve of suspicionless vehicle searches during routine 
traffic stops-a practice that the Court constitutionally constrains. LOCK, supra 
note 54, at 40-42 (finding that 44% of the public approved of the practice as 
compared to only 10% of lawyers); see Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 
(2009) (limiting vehicle searches incident to arrest to areas within arrestee's 
reach); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (limiting vehicle 
searches, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, to 
those areas of the car where police have probable cause to believe evidence 
could be found); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) 
(requiring that consent for search be voluntary). We take this as another sign 
that perceptions of fairness are somewhat more malleable than perceptions of 
distributive justice, which may signal that judicial deviations from perceptions 
of fairness are perhaps less problematic than more consistent (and culturally 
and temporarily resistant) perceptions of distributive justice. 
61. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996); Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 225-
26. 
62. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980). 
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indicates that lay perceptions apparently align with the judicial 
determination that police may not solicit consent based on false 
claims of legal authority to search.63 But, on other questions, it 
appears that courts may have it wrong. For instance, public 
perceptions are apparently at odds with decisions that, on the one 
hand, prohibit further interrogation once a suspect asks for 
counsel64 and, on the other, authorize undercover agents to trick a 
suspect into confessing to crime. 65 In a similar vein, findings 
suggest that-notwithstanding the Court's view to the contrary66_ 
reasonable people rarely feel free to refuse police requests. 
Specifically, one study found that eighty percent of suspects 
acquiesced to police search requests because they believed that the 
police would search even without consent.67 Another study found 
that most suspects did not feel free to leave or refuse to answer 
police questions in the context of street stops and bus interdiction.6B 
As these studies suggest, when courts pay insufficient attention 
to public perceptions, they may come to make unreasonable claims 
about the reasonable man. Courts may endorse ostensible 
reasonable beliefs that the reasonable public does not, in fact, 
share-that the public, instead, perceives to be either too deferential 
to the criminal class or, conversely, insufficiently protective of any 
citizen (save for the very paranoid). To the extent judicial intuitions 
63. LOCK, supra note 51, at 48 (finding that 90% of the public disapproves 
of permitting police to solicit consent based on a false claim of legal authority); 
see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968). 
64. LOCK, supra note 54, at 46 (finding 52% approval of allowing continued 
interrogation after suspect asks for counsel). The Supreme Court has found 
such questioning unconstitutional in certain circumstances. See Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) ("Whatever else it may mean, the right to 
counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that 
a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial 
proceedings have been initiated against him 'whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."' (quoting mrby 
v. Illinois, 402 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). But see Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 
1213, 1222-24 (2010) (permitting interrogation after a fourteen day break in 
custody). 
65. LOCK, supra note 54, at 46 (finding only 36% approval for confessions 
produced by police deception). Contra Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297-300 
(1990) (permitting questioning by undercover law enforcement personnel). 
66. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. 
67. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of 
Coercion, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 153, 204; see also Ilya Lichtenberg, Miranda in 
Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the 'Voluntary" Waiver of Fourth Amendment 
Rights, 44 How. L.J. 349, 367 (2001). However, another study indicated that 
suspects did not perceive as coercive police requests to search their residences. 
Dorothy K.agehiro, Perceived Voluntariness of Consent to Warrantless Police 
Searches, 18 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 38-49 (1988). 
68. David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth 
Amendment's Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 53 (2009); 
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 54, at 742 (finding that respondents ranked 
police requests to search luggage on bus as highly intrusive). 
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deviate from the lay perspective, courts risk undermining 
perceptions of legitimacy both by misapplying the relevant standard 
and by empowering police conduct that the public may find 
normatively problematic. Admittedly, courts may be less than 
perfectly competent to analyze and utilize social science, but good-
faith efforts to do so are undoubtedly superior to empty reliance on 
rank speculation. 
The takeaway is not just that courts should take seriously-at 
least as a factor-lay perceptions of fairness but that social 
scientists should get serious about the business of measuring those 
perceptions. For instance, social scientists could measure lay 
perspectives toward court decisions empowering police to arrest 
suspects for even nonjailable offenses (like driving without a 
seatbelt);69 to engage in pretextual stops and suspicion-less drug 
interdiction;70 to follow a fleeing suspect without triggering 
constitutional inquiry; 71 and to use evidence of flight to support a 
finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.72 In formulating 
these and other investigatory rules and standards, the Court has 
appealed to its notions of "common sense," of "ordinary human 
experience,"73 and of the "practical considerations of everyday life"74 
without demonstrating that the public shares its notions. The 
public may approve of, say, high-volume, relatively unintrusive 
police practices, like Terry stops and frisks, or it may instead favor 
low-volume (but perhaps more intrusive) practices, like house 
searches. The legitimacy project potentially has much to say on 
these questions. And, by listening, the system may cultivate 
deference for its rules and institutions. 
Significantly, the Court may not be alone in reaching unfounded 
empirical conclusions about public perceptions. A number of 
scholars have invoked the legitimacy project to advance pet projects 
and advocate pet reforms. For instance, for academics and 
observers troubled by the racially and economically disparate 
impacts of policing, it is tempting to conclude, without firm 
empirical bases, that urban communities find unfair aggressive 
order-maintenance policing and stop-and-frisk practices. 75 This is 
69. Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001). 
70. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 194 (2002); Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431. 
71. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991). 
72. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000). 
73. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) ("Much as a 'bright 
line' rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention 
is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern 
over rigid criteria."). 
74. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983). 
75. See, e.g., K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from ·Broken Windows: The 
Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 271, 279-80 (2009); Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force-Why Patrick 
Dorismond Didn't Have to Die, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2000, at 27; Bob 
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not to say that the claim is incorrect. To the contrary, there are 
strong indications that heavy-handed and targeted policing does 
indeed engender public disaffection and thereby may prove 
counterproductive (particularly in the historically disadvantaged 
communities that tend to be subject to high levels of enforcement).76 
But that is not the point. The point is that we do not definitively 
know. And, in such circumstances, academics should resist the 
temptation to rely too casually on the legitimacy project as a fulcrum 
to leverage idiosyncratic preferences and conceptions of what 
constitutes professional policing. Academics may appropriately offer 
policy prescriptions based on suggestive data, but they ought to 
acknowledge that the data is less than clear. 
How, then, might an academic appropriately confront concerns 
about the perceived legitimacy of borderline practices? The glib one-
word answer is "carefully." But, of course, we need to say more. The 
scholar must keep a focus on the complexities of legitimacy 
questions. Practices are multifaceted, and the public may perceive 
as fair or unfair some aspects or the frequency of a given practice. 
Herbert, Op-Ed., Jim Crow Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A27 
(characterizing stop and frisk as "a despicable, racially oriented tool of 
harassment," and describing the department's use of the stops as a 
"shameful ... abomination ... mistreatment ... [and a l nonstop humiliation of 
young black and Hispanic New Yorkers, including children, by police officers 
who feel no obligation to treat them fairly or with any respect at all"). 
76. Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MA.RQ. L. RF.V. 85, 92-94 
(2007); Rosen, supra note 75, at 27 (quoting Professor Dan Kahan, who 
indicated that order-maintenance policing is "a drug whose primary effect is 
that it will reduce crime, and its side effect is that it may exacerbate political 
ten~ions"); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order 
Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men's Perceptions of Police 
Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 272 (2010); see also NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AGENCY, TRENDS IN CASE AND DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS, AND 
CRIMINAL COURT PROCESSING AND OUTCOMES, IN NON-FELONY ARRESTS 
PROSECUTED IN NEW YORK CITY'S CRIMINAL COURTS 38-39 (2002), 
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/fnrep02.pdf ("The strained nature of police-
community relations has been recognized by the NYPD leadership, which has 
been developing since 1996 new initiatives to improve these 
relationships .... "); Excerpts From Remarks By the District Attorney, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at B5 (quoting Bronx District Attorney, Robert T. Johnson, 
discussing order-maintenance policing: "Feelings of fear and frustration 
abound. Troubling questions have been raised, particularly in communities of 
color ... regarding police-community relations, civil liberties and the issue of 
respect. . . . These questions must be addressed."); see also infra note 85 and 
accompanying text. See generally George Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Gang 
Behavior, Law Enforcement, and Community Values, in VALUES AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 191 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (noting that using "bricks and 
sticks" to enforce crime in ways that communities find unfair "may be self-
defeating"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American 
Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice 
Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 336, 338 (2011) (discussing 
implications of police treatment of civilians on perceptions of procedural 
justice). 
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Thorough analysis of legitimacy questions, thus, demands thorough 
understanding of the practice in question. By way of example, 
consider the aforementioned practices of order-maintenance policing 
and attendant stops and frisks-policing practices that have been 
the subject of particularly sharp criticism from scholars and civil 
libertarians who believe that such efforts have "reduce[d] the 
perceived legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public,"77 
especially where the efforts have been concentrated m 
predominately poor and minority high-crime neighborhoods.78 
A brief description of each practice is in order. First, order-
maintenance policing concentrates enforcement efforts on petty 
public-order offenses. The strategy is typically based on the broken 
windows theory, which posits that disorder, if tolerated, may foster 
an environment of more serious crimeJ9 Numerous urban police 
departments-most notably, the New York City Police Department 
("NYPD")-have embraced order-maintenance policing over the past 
two decades, leading to hundreds of thousands of additional arrests 
for minor crimes.80 Second, stop-and-frisk procedures (or so-called 
Terry stops and frisks) consist of brief detentions and searches based 
on "reasonable suspicion"-a standard that is less than probable 
cause.81 Specifically, under Terry, an officer has constitutional 
discretion to stop a suspect and frisk him for a weapon where the 
officer can articulate specific facts to support a reasonable suspicion 
that the suspect is armed and has committed, is committing, or is 
about to commit a crime.s2 Significantly, stop-and-frisk practices 
and order-maintenance policing are related, because a department 
that prioritizes public order will often come to rely heavily on stop 
77. Ray Rivera et aL, A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 2010, at Al (quoting Professor Richard Rosenfeld); see also Gau 
& Brun:;on, supra note 76, at 27~; supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
78. Bowers, supra note 76, at 87-88; Gau & Brunson, supra note 76, at 267; 
Rivera et aL, supra note 77, at A17. 
79. Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence 
from New York City and a Five-C£ty Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 
280-81 (2006). 
80. N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, supra note 76, at 39 (finding a more 
than two-fold rise in the number of nonfelony arrests in New York City between 
1989 and 1998, from 86,822 in 1989 to 176,432 in 1998 and finding a more than 
seven-fold rise in the number of drug arrests between 1975 and 1998, from 
17,207 in 1975 to 121,661 in 1998); JOHN JAY COLLEGE CENTER ON RACE, CRTME 
AND JUSTICE, STOP, QUESTION & FRISK POLICING PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY: A 
PRIMER 4-5 (2010), [hereinafter STOP & FRISK] available at 
http://www .jjay .cuny. ed u/web_images/PRIMER_electronic_ version. pdf 
(describing order-maintenance policing efforts in New York City, Los Angeles, 
and Philadelphia); Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
407, 422-40 (2000) (describing order-maintenance policing efforts in New York 
City, Boston, and Chicago). 
81. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968). 
82. Id. at 21. 
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and frisk. 83 For instance, use of Terry stops by the NYPD 
skyrocketed dramatically from approximately 97,000 such stops in 
2002, to more than 160,000 stops in 2003, to nearly 580,000 stops in 
2009.84 
Without question, these policing efforts can be aggressive, but 
have they, in fact, generated disapproval from the public? Or is the 
academic perception of backlash a false academic perception of 
public perception? On this central question, there is a remarkable 
lack of empirical evidence. In all likelihood, the answer is nuanced. 
On the one hand, there appears to be a genuine perception among at 
least some people in some neighborhoods that stop-and-frisk and 
order-maintenance policing practices are invidious and thereby 
unfair.85 On the other hand, most people approve of Terry stops and 
frisks.sa Ultimately, there is probably significant variation in 
83. Rivera et al., supra note 76, at Al7 ("'The stops conducted by us are to 
address ... the quality-of-life issues." (quoting NYPD department head)). 
84. STOP & FRISK, supra note 80, at 4; Rivera et al., supra note 76, at Al7; 
cf. Colleen Long, Police Stop More than 1 Million People on the Street, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2009/10/08/stop-and-frisk-police-sto_n_314509.html (detailing doubling of stops 
in Philadelphia and Los Angeles). 
85. ALLEN et al., supra note 59, at 569 ("There is substantial evidence that 
aggressive use, and misuse of the stop-and-frisk power continues to be a major 
source of tension between police and people of color."); see supra note 65 and 
accompanying text. Notably, the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders (also known as the "Kerner Commission") attributed indiscriminate 
stop-and-frisk practices with contributing to the "deep hostility between police 
and ghetto communities" that ultimately led to the deadly urban race riots of 
the 1960s. Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, The Court> and Some Realism 
About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 177-78 (1999). More generally, 
studies have shown that as many as two-thirds of African Americans perceive 
the criminal justice system to be racist, as opposed to less than one-third of 
whites. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the 
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 699 (1995); see also Lawrence D. 
Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black and VVhite Americans> 
Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DuBOIS REV. 151, 156 
(2004); Richard J. Lundman & Robert L. Kaufman, Driving While Black: Effects 
of Race, Ethnicity> and Gender on Citizens Self-Reports of Traffic Stops and 
Police Actions, 41 CRHvTINOLOGY 195, 210 (2003) ("[B]eliefs in the legitimacy and 
propriety of police actions are framed by a polarity between blacks and 
whites."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbls. 2.12.2005, 2.21.2005, 2.0002.2005 
(2005), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost_2.html (indicating 
that compared to white Americans, Mrican Americans are several times more 
likely to have a low or very low opinion of the honesty and ethical standards of 
police; are almost three times more likely to have very little confidence in the 
police; and are more likely to think there is police brutality in their 
communities). 
86. LOCK, supra note 54, at 41; see also David Thacher, Order Maintenance 
Reconsidered: Moving Beyond Strong Causal Reasoning, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 381, 386 (2004) (discussing political popularity of order-
maintenance policing and observing that "challenges to the broken windows 
theory have not yet discredited order maintenance policing with policymakers 
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perspective within and across populations.87 Specifically, even if the 
general public favors these practices, residents of high-crime 
neighborhoods would seem to be more conflicted. These residents 
internalize directly both the costs and benefits of policing and crime, 
and they appear to harbor anxieties about each.88 In such 
circumstances, police walk a fine line between impressions of callous 
disregard and repressive overreach. And, to effectively chart this 
course, police could benefit from rigorous empirical study of the 
levels of enforcement that targeted communities perceive to be too 
much or not enough. But, to date, there has been too much shouting 
and too little study. 
Finally, questions about the perceived legitimacy of stop-and-
frisk and order-maintenance policing are complicated by questions 
about the perceived legitimacy of racial profiling-yet another 
nuanced question. And a further complication is that the public 
may fail to differentiate what is and is not racial profiling in the 
first instance. Specifically, for present purposes, we take racial 
profiling to be the practice of using race qua race as a factor in 
enforcement decisions. 89 This practice is, therefore, to be 
distinguished from other types of profiling that merely may 
correlate to race or ethnicity.9o On the one hand, the public seems to 
overwhelmingly support the use of drug-courier and terrorist 
or the public" notwithstanding the fact "among criminologists, order 
maintenance is clearly under siege"). 
87. For example, suspects, arrestees, and defendants seem to more 
squarely disapprove of the aggressive approaches. Gau & Brunson, supra note 
76, at 266-67 (reporting that "[s]tudy participants believed that the poor 
treatment they received from the pohce ... was intimately tied to their status 
as poor, urban males," and that participants had concluded that police stop-and-
frisk practices were "overly aggressive ... demeaning ... [and] inordinate[ly] 
frequen[t]"); Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 262. 
88. Bowers, supra note 76, at 91; Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and 
Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement: 
Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. R.c;v. 137, 140 (1997) 
(discussing "dual frustration" in minority communities that "uniquely 
experience problems" associated with both crime and criminal enforcement); 
Rivera et al., supra note 77 (quoting a community leader who observed that 
neighborhood residents "welcome the police" but they "also fear the police 
because you can get stopped at any time"); id. (indicating that residents report 
that they "philosophically embrace the police presence," but that they "often 
come away from encounters with officers feeling violated, degraded and 
resentfuf' because "day-to-day interactions with officers can seem so arbitrary"). 
89. Cf Deborah J. Schildkraut, The Dynamics of Public Opinion on Ethnic 
Profiling After 9111: Results from a Survey Experiment, 53 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 61, 67 (2009) (defining racial profiling as decision making based on 
the belief that certain racial groups "are more likely than others to commit 
certain types of crime"); Racial Profiling and the War on Terror, 
PUBLICAGENDA.ORG, http://www.publicagenda.org/red-flags/racial-profili.ng-and-
war-terror (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (approving the 
use of drug-courier profiles). 
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profiles. 91 On the other hand, there appears to be something closer 
to cross-demographic consensus that racial profiling, as we define it, 
is illegitimate.92 Making matters more complicated still, different 
demographic groups tend to disagree about whether a particular 
practice is motivated by race (and therefore an instance of what we 
take to be genuine racial profiling).93 For instance, one study 
indicated that although whites tended to find racial profiling 
problematic they were less likely to perceive borderline police 
conduct to be discriminatory.94 Perhaps for that reason, perceptions 
by whites of normatively problematic police conduct were not shown 
to influence levels of deference in a statistically significant way, 
whereas such perceptions were shown to influence deference levels 
amongst minorities.95 Put simply, minorities appear likelier to 
believe that illegitimate police practices are not just unfair in the 
general sense, but also biased against them. 
And two final observations that further muddy the analyses of 
racial profiling specifically and order-maintenance policing and stop-
and-frisk practices generally: First, there also appear to be 
generational gaps in perceptions of profiling.96 Second, perceptions 
of profiling-and controversial police practices more generally-are 
elastic. At distinct historical moments, tactics like profiling may 
look different to the discerning publie.97 Put differently, perceptions 
91. LOCK, supra note 54, at 42, 54. 
92. Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 254 (citing a December 1999 Gallup 
poll indicating that more than 80% of Americans "disapprove" of profiling); 
Darren K. Carlson, Racial Profiling Seen as Pervasive, Unjust, GALLUP (July 20, 
2004), http://www .gallup.com/poll/12406/racial-profiling -~een ·pervasive-unjust 
.aspx; see also Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Why Does the 
Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and 
Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL 'y & L. 419, 429 (2011) ("White 
respondents view the police as less fair and less legitimate if they target 
minorities."); Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 255 ("(W]hen people believe 
that profiling is wide~pread and/or that they have been profiled, their support 
for the police fades."); Schildkraut, supra note 89, at 70 (finding public 
disapproval of racial profiling); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Racially 
Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen Perceptions, 83 Soc. FoRCES 1009, 
1025 (2005) (finding public disapproval of racial profiling). 
93. Huq et al., supra note 92 ("[M]inority group members are more likely to 
believe that the police 'racially profile' minorities. However, ... [w]hite 
respondents [also] view profiling of minorities as unfair and, when they believe 
it occurs, view the police as less legitimate."); Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, 
at 275. 
94. Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15. 
95. !d. at 267 ("The results indicate that profiling was directly linked to 
legitimacy and performance among minority respondents ... but not among 
white respondents. Hence, profiling had a negative impact on policing, but only 
among minority respondents."). 
96. ld. at 262 (indicating that "young people and those personally involved 
in an experience with the police [l have more negative views about them"). 
97. Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2002) ("We had just reached a consensus on 
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of profiling have shifted over time depending on the salient 
reference point. For example, we could compare responses to the 
beating of Rodney King, to the 9/11 terrorist attacks,98 to the 
problem of illegal immigration,99 to the violence associated with the 
Mexican drug trade. 
Ultimately, the extent to which any of these three related 
policing practices-order-maintenance policing, stop-and-frisk 
practices, and racial profiling-negatively influence communal 
perceptions of legitimacy turns on a definition of the relevant 
community. In the separate context of empirical desert, we think it 
makes sense to define the relevant community as the populace 
covered by a contemplated liability or punishment rule, because the 
reach of substantive criminal law typically extends all the way to 
the state's borders. But discretionary enforcement practices are 
more often developed and implemented locally and, accordingly, 
should remain locally responsive.1°0 Thus, in the context of 
legitimacy, a narrower definition of community may be warranted, 
but it is not clear how to go about coherently narrowing community 
to some subset of the sovereign whole.IOI Moreover, it is not even 
clear whether the appropriate measure of community ought to be 
geographic, cultural, or sociodemographic. Undoubtedly, there are 
racial profiling. By September 10, 2001, virtually everyone ... agreed that 
racial profiling was very bad. We also knew what racial profiling was . . . . All 
this 0 changed in the wake of the September 11 attacks . . . . And now lots of 
people are for it."). 
98. Huq et al., supra note 92, at 423 ("[P]eople may respond differently to 
counterterrorism policing than to crime-control because they view terrorism as 
imposing a graver risk of harm to individuals than the more diffuse 
consequences of ordinary crime .... [P)eople may have different normative 
assessments of crimes and terrorism."); Schildkraut, supra note 89, at 67-78 
(finding that support for racial profiling increased when the subject group is 
Arab Americans). Nevertheless, the war on terrorism raises its own set of 
legitimacy concerns. Several scholars have made the claim that certain 
antiterrorism efforts may prove counterproductive, becauoe they are perceived 
as illegitimate within the wider Muslim world. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Stephen 
J. Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in 
Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & Soc'y REV. 
365, 374 (2010). Specifically, critics highlight backlash against erroneous 
detainment and the relative absence of judicial process. Id. at 371-72. Indeed, 
several studies have shown that perceived injustice of American military action 
is correlated with support for Iraqi resistance. Id. at 372. 
99. See, e.g., S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). A majority of 
Americans appear to support the Arizona law. Rasmussen Reports, Nationally, 
60% Fauor Letting Local Police Stop and Verify Immigration Status (Apr. 26, 
2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_contentlpolitics/current_events 
limmigrationlnationally _60_favor_letting_local_police_stop_and_ verify _immigra 
tion_status. 
100. William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1969, 2040 
(2008). 
101. Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Dangers of "Community," 
2003 UTAH L. REV. 343, 343 (2003). 
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defensible (or at least workable) definitions, but questions will 
remain over whose perceptions should matter when opinions are 
split within a given community. For instance, we might prioritize 
the perceptions of those most affected by police practices, those most 
affected by crime, those constituting a democratic majority, those 
who are members of historically subordinated minorities, or those 
who are likelier to defer to legitimate authority (if such groups are 
identifiable). 
Finally, because of the malleability of perceptions of fairness, 
legitimacy advocates must reconcile themselves to the fact that a 
system premised even partially on legitimacy may come to adopt 
procedural rules and standards that may vary from place to place, 
community to community, and time to time--a scenario that some 
may find especially problematic when it comes to purportedly 
nationally applicable standards and rules)02 Such variation is not 
indefensible-and, in fact, may be desirable, even in the 
constitutional context-but it may require advocates to stake out 
cognizable positions on seemingly unrelated questions, like the 
feasibility and appropriateness of theories of localism and popular 
constitutionalism.l03 In short, the issues at play are inexorably 
complex. But, significantly, they are not insoluble. Academics and 
reformers ought to pursue legitimacy-based arguments, but they 
ought to take care to ensure that their arguments are sufficiently 
theorized before they may effectively invoke perceptions of 
legitimacy to resolve controversial public-policy questions. 
2. Fair Adjudication 
The legitimacy project could also provide insight into lay 
perceptions about procedural rules and standards that regulate 
prosecutors and courts. For instance, it might be useful to inquire 
into whether laypersons favor inclusion of an actual-innocence 
verdict option; whether they are troubled by the lack of a 
102. Cf. Allen et al., supra note 59, at 365 ("[D]o we want a body of Fourth 
Amendment law in which the very meaning of the search may vary from place 
to place?"). Indeed, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court rejected arguments for a 
constitutional arrest standard that took into consideration a state specific 
arrest rule for misdemeanor cases. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) 
("[L]inking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would cause them to 
'vary from place to place and from time to time' . . . . It would be strange 
to ... [constitutionally] restrict state officers ... solely because the States have 
passed search-and-seizure laws that are the prerogative of independent 
sovereigns."). 
103. For the leading arguments in favor of localism and popular 
constitutionalism, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Richard C. Schragger, The 
Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371 (2001). For leading articles 
extending some of these ideas to criminal procedure and justice, see generally 
Stuntz, supra note 100; Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1745 (2005). 
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constitutional claim for actual innocence; or whether they perceive 
as fair such things as standing requirements, exhaustion doch·ines, 
peremptory challenges, speedy-trial rules, double jeopardy, the 
inability of prosecutors to comment on a defendant's exercise of her 
right to remain silent, or the inability of jurors to learn of sentencing 
consequences pre-verdict. With respect to all of these procedural 
rules and standards, social scientists could ask whether there are 
disconnects between adjudicative practices and public perceptions of 
fairness, and whether any such rifts undermine perceptions of 
systemic legitimacy more generally and ultimately deference to law 
and legal authorities. 
One of the most contentious procedural rules is the exclusionary 
rule.104 And, because it is so controversial, it has been the subject of 
some promising research into its perceived legitimacy. Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, one study found that an overwhelming 
majority of respondents disapproved even of using illegally obtained 
evidence for impeachment purposes (a maneuver that the Supreme 
Court constitutionally has authorized)_105 More recently, 
Kenworthey Bilz found that public perceptions of the rule may be 
parsed according to the particular rationale offered for its use.106 
According to Bilz, the public endorses the rule when it is used to 
promote the integrity of the criminal justice system, but less so 
when it is used to promote deterrence only-a significant finding 
that runs counter to the conventional (and almost exclusive) judicial 
reliance on the deterrence rationale.l07 Of course, this raises the 
question of whether the exclusionary rule serves aggregate systemic 
integrity because conceptually the rule can only advance integrity 
along one dimension by sacrificing it along another. 
Concretely, the exclusionary rule limits the ill-gotten gains of 
the state by granting an undeserved windfall to factually guilty 
defendants. On one reading, such a tradeoff is no affront to systemic 
integrity; it is the price of integrity-the cost of honoring the 
presumption of innocence and the corresponding allocation of the 
burden of proof to the state. But, significantly, it may not be 
perceived as such by the public. The paradox of the exclusionary 
rule is that the court must tolerate the illegality of one party or 
104. Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental 
Examination of the Exclusionary Rule 4--5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with Northwestern University School of Law), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629375. 
105. LOCK, supra note 54, at 45 (finding that only 27% of the public approved 
of using tainted evidence for impeachment purposes). See also United States v. 
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 
(1971). 
106. Bilz, supra notP. 104. 
107. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) ("If ... the 
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use 
in the instant situation is unwarranted."). 
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another: the state that builds a case unlawfully or the guilty 
defendant who gets off scot-free. To determine which is the lesser 
evil, it would be wise to consider the perceptions of the public. And, 
to that end, more empirical study is needed. For instance, social 
scientists might inquire whether people consider the exclusionary 
rule to be procedurally unfair where (as is almost certainly the case) 
it leads to unequal treatment and under-enforcement for reasons 
unrelated to desert or factual guilt. Or they might ask a more 
nuanced question: whether people believe that crime severity should 
factor into decisions of whether the exclusionary rule applies-a 
position the Court has steadfastly rejected.10s At a minimum, the 
research thus far supports the notion that courts should probably 
give more credence (or at least some lip-service) to the expressive 
integrity justification for the exclusionary rule, and should perhaps 
rely less upon the commonly invoked utilitarian deterrence 
justification that the public apparently feels is comparatively less 
important. 
And the exclusionary rule is not the only procedure designed to 
both regulate executive actors and to promote integrity. The same 
could be said of, say, speedy triall09 and double jeopardy11 o rules and 
108. Cf. Sergio Herzog, The Relationship Between Public Perceptions of 
Crime Seriousness and Support for Plea-Bargaining Practices in Israel: A 
.Factorial-Survey Approach, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 122-28 (2008) 
(finding that opposition to plea bargaining varied according to severity of charge 
and harm). Scholars have questioned whether courts ought to consider crime 
severity when applying the exclusionary rule. Allen et al., supra note 59, at 344 
("Does the exclusionary rule seem more palatable in cases in which the crime is 
substantively questionable? If the nature of the crime ... strengthens the 
argument for an exclusionary rule, might a more serious crime offer a reason for 
limiting the rule? Why not hold that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible-
unless the evidence was seized in a homicide investigation, or an investigation 
of terrorist networks?"); see also William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of 
Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 434-35 (1995). The same argument 
could also be made about other constitutional procedural standards, like 
determinations of probable cause. Allen et al., supra note 59, at 434 ("For every 
search or arrest where the probable cause standard applies ... the standard 
does not vary according to the seriousness of the crime . . . . Why should that be 
so? Doesn't the state have a much stronger interest in investigating some 
crimes than others? ... Shouldn't [it] matter to the governing Fourth 
Amendment standard ... [that a case involves] marijuana, and not a set of 
plans to blow up a large public building?"); Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment 
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 784-85 (1994) ("[P]robable cause cannot 
be a fixed standard. It would make little sense to insist on the same amount of 
probability regardless of the imminence of the harm . . . . [R]easonableness 
obviously does require different levels of cause in different contexts, and not 
always a high probability of success, if, say, we are searching for bombs on 
planes."). Analogously, Holmes maintained that the test for cognizable criminal 
attempts ought to take account of the severity of the object crime. Hyde v. 
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 387-88 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. United 
States v. Coplon, 185 F.Zd 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1950). 
109. Alfredo Garcia, Speedy Trial Swift Justice: Full-Fledged Right or 
"Second-Cla..c;s Citizens?," 31 Sw. L. REV. 31, 50 (1992) (discussing the windfall 
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standards, which also provide undeserved windfalls to at least some 
guilty defendants. Public perceptions of these rules and standards 
may turn on the degree and type of state fault and precisely what 
bad acts the defendant is alleged to have done. For example, when 
it comes to double jeopardy, the public may be likelier to perceive as 
unfair and unjust intentional prosecutorial efforts to file succe.ssive 
charges that just pass the formulaic Blockburger test over 
unintentional prosecutorial slip-ups that just fail it.ll 1 Likewise, 
when it comes to speedy trial, the public may disapprove of 
exploitative shorter delays over inadvertent or even negligent longer 
ones.ll2 Or it may be that, in each instance, the public perceives 
fault to be relatively unimportant to the question of whether the 
trial delay or successive prosecution is procedurally just. Again, it 
may depend, to a degree, on whether public perceptions of fairness 
turn principally on sanctioning (and thereby deterring) abusive 
exercises of executive power or on promoting the integ1·ity of the 
criminal justice system more generally. In short, there is a lot to 
unpack and much room for further study. 
Comparatively, researchers have done substantially more work 
on public perceptions of bargained dispositions, the dominant 
adjudicatory practice in American criminal justice.113 These studies 
reveal that most Americans disapprove of plea bargaining-as many 
as four-fifths, according to some studies. 114 However, it is unclear 
benefit of criminal immunity received by the small number of accused who take 
advantage of the failure of courts to provide speedy trials). 
llO. Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional 
Remedies, 77 WASIL U. L. REV. 713, 801 (1999) (explaining that double jeopardy 
can provide the defendant with a windfall from the judge's precipitous acts 
when the judge acts irrationally or irresponsibly). 
111. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); cf. OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009) (1881) ("(E]ven 
a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked."). 
112. Indeed, the Supreme Court already considers the reason for delay to be 
an important (if not paramount) factor in the determination of a constitutional 
speedy-trial violation. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656-57 (1992); 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
113. See, e.g., Casper et al., supra note 1, at 493 ("[P]rocedural justice does 
appear to be related to the defendants' sense that their treatment by courts has 
been satisfactory."). 
114. Ronald W. Fagan, Public Support for the Courts: An Examination of 
Alternative Explanations, 9 J. CRIM. JUST. 403, 407 (1981) (finding that 82% of 
respondents disapproved of plea bargaining); Laura B. Myers, Bringing the 
Offender to lleel.· Views of the Criminal Courts, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 46, 55 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (finding 
that 67% of respondents disapproved of plea bargaining); S'rAT. ANALYSIS CTR., 
DEP'T OF ECON. & CM'l'Y. DE:V., OHIO CI'I'TZEN ATTITUDES: A SURVEY OF PUBLIC 
OPINION ON CRIME 7 (Jeffrey Knowles ed., 1979) (finding that 67% of 
respondents disagreed with the statement that prosecutors should be able to 
reduce felony charges to misdemeanor charges in exchange for guilty pleas), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffi1es1/Digitizationf77338NCJRS.pdf; WIS. 
POLICY RESEARCH lNST., REPORT: WISCONSIN CITIZEN SURVE:Y 68 (1988) (finding 
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whether these negative public perceptions of the practice are 
products of procedural or substantive objections-that is, whether 
the public disapproves of the lack of trials and attendant formal 
process and transparency (legitimacy objections) or of the perceived 
lenient, harsh, or unequal outcomes (distributive-juslice 
objections).115 By contrast, practitioners overwhelmingly and 
predictably approve of plea bargaining as a necessary tool to 
efficiently manage high caseloads. 116 Somewhat more surprising are 
studies that have found that defendants may approve of bargaining 
and may derive similar, or even greater, satisfaction following pleas 
than trials. 117 The reasons are unclear. It may be that defendants 
appreciate the ab-ility to exercise some dominion over their own 
fates-a kind of "process control" that "may foster a greater sense of 
participation."118 It may be that the very informality of the plea 
that 72% of respondents disapproved of plea bargaining), available at 
http:/lwww.wpri.org/ReportsNolume%201Nollnol.pdf; see also Michael M. 
O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 445 (2008) 
("Public opinion surveys consistently find low approval rates of plea 
bargaining."). 
115. See Robert F. Rich & Roberl J. Sampson, Public Perceptions of Criminal 
Justice Policy: Does Victimization Make a Difference?, G VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 
109, 113-14 (1990) (indicating that across socio-demographic groups, 
individuals disapprove of plea bargaining because the practice results in lenient 
sentences); see also Stanley A Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to 
Plea BargaZ:ning, .12 CRIM. L.Q. 85, 102 (1989) (discussing a Canadian study 
tracing opposition to plea bargaining to perceived leniency). 
116. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROC8SS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING 
CASES IN A LOWER ClllMINAL COURT 185-86 (1979); MILTON HF.UMANN, PLEA 
BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PHOSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS 157-62 (1978). 
117. JONATHAN D. CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANTS PERSPECTIVE 
51 (1978) ("One of the peculiar differences between trial and plea defendants is 
the greater propensity of those who have had trials to complain that they have 
not had the chance to present their side of the case."); Casper et al., supra note 
1, at 496-9R ("Finally, whether the defendant was convicted by a plea or a trial 
is unrelated to a sense of procedural justice .... Those who plead guilty do not 
report having received less procedural fairness than those whose conviction was 
produced by triaL"). 
llS. CASPER, supra note 117, at 51; see E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R TYLF.R, THE 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCF;DURAL JUSTICE 106 (1988) ("The perception that 
one has had an opportunity to express oneself and to have one's views 
considered by someone in power plays a critical role in fairness judgments."); 
TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 163 (observing that "an opportunity Lo take part 
in the decision-making process" contributes significantly to perceptions that 
procedures are fair); E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control and Procedural Justice: 
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Value Concerns in ~Fairness Judgments, 59 
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 952, 957 (1990) ("Research has suggested that 
the opportunity for participation may be important to individuals even when 
their participation is unlikely to affect the decision. This suggests that on some 
occasions, even non-meaningful voice may lead individuals to assess a process 
as more fair."); Tom R. Tyler eL al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with 
Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
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process makes it more comprehensible to defendants than 
professionally dominated and highly technical rule-bound trials.ll9 
It may be that defendants appreciate the certainty of guilty pleas or 
(like practitioners) the efficiency of avoiding the process costs of 
trials. 120 Or it may be Lhat defendants are more satisfied with 
sentencing outcomes after pleas than trials. 
Plainly, there is much more to explore concerning lay 
perceptions of plea bargaining and whether and to what degree 
those perceptions are shaped by procedural practices, as opposed to 
substantive results. Additionally, there are a number of corollary or 
subsidiary bargaining practices that have received almost no 
attention at all. For instance, it is unclear what laypersons think of 
arguably strained judici::d constructions of "voluntariness" in the 
plea-bargaining contcxt.l21 Likewise, it is unclear what laypersons 
think of so-called Alford pleas-equivocal pleas in which defendants 
accept guilt while protesting innocence.l22 And it is also unclear 
what laypersons think of other nontraditional pleas, like cooperation 
agreements. 123 Under cooperation agreements, cooperating 
defendants are ultimately punished not according to desert, but 
according to the crime-control value of the help that they provide to 
legal authorities. 121 Indeed, some of the most culpable defendants 
may receive the most significant discounts because they have the 
most information to sell. These utilitarian bargains may serve 
PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985); see also supra notes 110 and infra notes 140-43, 208 
and accompanying text. 
119. Cf Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation. in Criminal 
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 920-22 (2006) (discussing complexity and lack 
of transparency of modern trials); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short 
History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & Soc'Y Rr~V. 261, 262-65 (1979) (describing 
simplicity of pre-modern jury trials). 
120. FEELEY, supra note 116, at 185-86; HEUMJ\NN, supra note 116, at 70 
(indicating that many defendants just want to "get it over with"); Josh Bowers, 
Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. HEV. 1117, 1132-39 (2008). 
121. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (presuming that a 
defendant advised by competent counsel is capable of making an intelligent 
decision of whether to accept or reject a plea agreement); Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970) (stating whether or not a plea is voluntary 
depends on all of surrounding circumstances). 
122. Cf Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values 
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford und Nolo Contendere Pleas, ,88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1388 (2003) (d.isc:ussing an informal poll of law students 
to gauge perceptions of Alford pleas). 
123. See, e.g., STAT. ANALYSIS CTR., supra note 114, at 7 (finding that 53.4% 
of respondents disagreed with the statement that prosecutors should be 
permitted to trade charge reduction for testimony). 
124. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of 
Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 292, 292 (1996). 
Contra Frank 0. Bowman, Defending Substantial Assistance: An Old 
Prosecutor's Meditation on Singleton, Sealed Case, and the Maxfield-Kramer 
Report, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 45, 45 (1999). 
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instrumental goals, t25 but only at retributive costs that the public 
may perceive to be unfair and unjust.l26 Finally, it is unclear what 
laypersons think of reforms intended to provide victims with more 
s-ignificant roles in plea bargaining and adjudication generally.12 7 
B. Creating Moral Credibility 
Studies confirm that laypeople think of criminal liability and 
punishment in terms of desert-the moral blameworthiness of the 
offender-and not in terms of other principles, such as general 
deterrence and incapacitation, which have been so popular with 
system designers during the past several decades.l28 Thus, people 
naturally expect that a criminal justice system will distribute 
criminal liability and punishment so as to do justice. 
However, studies have shown that current liability and 
punishment rules commonly undermine the criminal law's 
reputation for doing justice. One recent study showed that a wide 
range of modern crime-control doctrines treat cases in ways that 
dramatically conflict with laypeople's intuitions of justice.129 The 
125. llonald S. Safer & Matthew C. Crowl, Substantial Assistance 
Departures: Valuable Tool or Dangerous Weapon?, 12 FED. SEN'l''G HEP. 41, ·11 
(1999) (crediting cooperation agreements with breaking up drug gangs in 
Chicago). 
126. Snitch (PBS television documentary broadcast Jan. lL., 1999). Social 
scientists could also ask legitimacy questions about discrete facets of the plea 
process. For instance, it is unclear what laypersons think of the somewhat open 
constitutional question of whether prosecutors must disclose exculpatory 
evidence to defendants prior to plea. A number of lower courts have held that 
prosecutors must. See, e.g., United SLates v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 
1998). However, the Supreme Court's holding that prosecutors need not 
disclose impeachment evidence prior to plea indicates that in the future it may 
hold likPwise as to exculpatory evidence. United States v. Rui~, 536 U.S. 622, 
629 (2002). 
127. There is some inclication-again, consistent with the nexus identified 
between "process control" and perceptions of fair procedure-that victims 
perceive as legitimate procedures in which they play roles, even if they do not 
ultimately affect outcomes. See supra note 118 and accompanying text; infra 
note 229 and accompanying text. Indeed, Stephanos Bibas reported that three· 
quarters of victims considered it "very important" to be able to weigh in on 
decisions about charge dismissals, plea negotiations, sentencing, and parole 
proceedings. Bibas, supra note 119, at 929 ("Participating makes victims feel 
empowered and helps them to heal emotionally. More generally, citizens report 
that participating in the legal system increases their respect for the system and 
empowers them."); see also Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing 
the Harm: Victims and Restoratiue Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 21 (2003) 
(noting that participation empowers victims and promotes healing and closure). 
128. See, e.g., Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Dar1ey, Psychological Aspects 
of Retributive Justice, 40 .ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 193, 233-35 
(2008); Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just 
Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 284, 295 
(2002); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for 
Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000). 
129. See Robinson et al., supra note 3, at 1949-79. 
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conflict exists for such standard doctrines as "three strikes" and 
other habitual offender statutes, high penalties for drug offenses, 
adult prosecution of juveniles, abolition or narrowing of the insanity 
defense, strict liability, felony murder, and criminalization of 
regulatory violations. The conflicts were shown to undermine the 
criminal law's moral credibility with the subjectsJ30 Previous 
studies had results consistent with those results.1~1 
It appears, then, that to build moral credibility, the criminal 
law must avoid conflict with the community's principles of justice. 
While there is still much work to be done, current research tells us 
something about community views on a wide variety of criminal law 
issues, including studies on: objective requirements of attempt; 
creating a criminal risk; objective requirements of complicity; 
omission liability; use of deadly force in self-defense; use of force in 
defense of property; citizens' law enforcement authority; mistake or 
accident defenses; culpability requirements generally; culpability 
requirements for complicity; voluntary intoxication; 
individualization of the objective standard of negligence, insanity, 
immaturity, and involuntary intoxication; duress and entrapment 
defenses; felony murder; causation requirements; and punishment 
for multiple offenses.l32 Other studies have examined lay intuitions 
on whether guilt should be determined according to objectivist or 
subjectivist views of criminality,l33 on competing theories of 
blackmai},l34 on offense grading distinctions,135 and on competing 
theories of justification.l36 
The studies make clear that current criminal law regularly 
deviates from the community's justice judgments. And with each 
instance, the law risks undermining its moral credibility with the 
community. While many of the deviations are sufficiently minor to 
have little impact on their own, the cumulative effect of the many 
deviations can have a substantial practical impact, as Part III 
130. See id. at 1994-2025. 
131. See text accompanying notes 179-95, infra. 
132. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIA13ILITY, 
AND BLAME: COJ\1MUNITY Vmws AND THE CRIMINAL LAw STUDIES (1995) 
[hereinafter JLB] (reporting study results). 
133. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Objectivist Versus Subjectivist 
Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law 
Theory, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 409 (1998). 
134. See Paul H. Robinson et al., Competing Theories of Blackmail: An 
Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291 
(2010). 
135. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American 
Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 709 (2010). 
136. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of 
Justification, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1095 (1998). 
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discusses. Consider this summary of studies, as reported by 
Robinson and Darley.137 
The studies report many sources of law-community conflict in 
relation to the criminal law's secondary prohibitions, such as 
inchoate offenses, omission liability, and complicity liability.13S 
Modern American criminal codes commonly would impose liability 
where laypersons would not, or would impose considerably less. 
Consider a variety of examples of such conflicts. Subjects found the 
dangerous proximity test embodied in the common law a more 
proper test for attempt liability than the substantial step test of the 
Model Penal Code ("Code"), upon which most modern American 
criminal codes are based.l39 Subjects gave more weight to 
renunciation of a criminal attempt even when that attempt had 
progressed far enough to trigger liability.l40 The respondents 
believed that unsuccessful attempts to assist in a crime called for 
little or no liability,141 which is more consistent with the common 
law rule than the Code's treatment, which imposes full offense 
liability. 142 Subjects gave a person who intends murder, but creates 
only a slight risk of causing a slight harm, a sentence greatly 
reduced from the Code's treatment of the act as attempted 
murder. 143 Subjects did not give an accomplice to crime the level of 
liability equal to that they assigned to the principal, contrary to the 
Code's approach.l44 Finally, subjects found a person who failed in 
his or her duty to rescue a person from death to be somewhat 
culpable but not for murder, again in conflict with the Code.l45 
The conflicts moved in the other direction as well, with 
respondents imposing greater liability than that imposed by modern 
codes, or assigning liability in cases in which the codes do not. For 
example, subjects assigned liability to individuals who develop a 
settled intention to commit a crime, even though modern codes 
assign none unless that intention is translated into action.l46 
Likewise, respondents imposed some liability on persons who failed 
to assist a person in distress, although modern American codes 
typically do not.147 
These points of conflict are really just symptoms of conflicts in 
broad perspective between laypersons and the Code. Note that 
respondents consistently assigned reduced liabilities to individuals 
137. JLB, supra note 132. 
138. For a fuller discussion, see id. at ch. 2. 








147. Id. at 50-51. 
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who play secondary roles in the commission of a crime, even though 
the Code assigns them liabilities equivalent to the principal. Also, 
subjects assigned reduced liability for the violation of secondary 
prohibitions (such as attempt), even though the Code assigns 
liabilities equivalent to those assigned for the substantive offense. 
That is, the results suggest that the community is more "harm-
oriented" than is the Code, at least in grading the seriousness of 
wrongdoing. 148 
The criminal law's justification defenses show a variety of 
points of conflict with community views.l49 The subjects considered 
the justifications to be more compelling than the modern legal codes 
in a variety of instances. When force is used in self-defense, in 
defense of property, or to apprehend a fleeing offender, respondents 
frequently assigned no liability in cases to which the Code did.150 
Even when respondents assigned liability, they typically would 
grade the violation as considerably lower than would the Code.l51 
The differences between community standards and criminal codes 
becomes apparent when studies examine what people think is 
justifiable in defense of property, and even more apparent in the 
cases involving a citizen who uses force to apprehend a criminal 
fleeing a crime or to apprehend a person thought to be a criminal 
fleeing a crime. The respondents were willing to tolerate the use of 
more force than the Code permits, and assigned lesser sanctions to 
defendants for the use of force even in the instances in which they 
felt that some blame ought to accrue.I52 
Studies of the culpability requirements for offenses revealed 
several points of conflict between community views and criminal 
law.l53 For example, there is a general approval of the law's 
tendency to make a major differentiation between reckless and 
negligent commission of an offense. Subjects imposed significantly 
different liability assignments depending on whether the individual 
was reckless with respect to the various elements specified as 
relevant by modern codes, or merely negligent.154 Most codes assign 
no higher liability for an offense (other than homicide) committed 
knowingly or purposefully than one committed recklessly. Subjects, 
in contrast, assigned higher liability for higher culpability than 
recklessness.I55 Subjects also distinguished recklessly committed 
offenses from negligently committed ones, but unlike the general 
code treatment, sometimes assigned significant liability even for 
148. Robinson & Darley, supra note 133, at 413. 
149. For a fuller discussion, see JLB, supra note 132, at ch. 3. 
150. Id. at 79-80. 
151. Id. at 80. 
152. Id. 
153. For a fuller discussion, see id. at ch. 4. 
154. Id. at 123. 
155. ld. at 123-24. 
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negligently committed offenses_156 In general, to accurately reflect 
communal judgments, drafters should redraft codes to have liability 
vary with the culpability level of the offender. 
A similar result emerged when studies examined the culpability 
requirements for complicity. The codes set purposefulness as to 
assisting the principal as the minimum requirement for complicity, 
but respondents were willing to assign liability to a person who 
knowingly, or even recklessly, assists. Respondents assigned 
different and lower levels of liability as the culpability level 
decreased, which again suggests that the community would prefer 
differences in grading based upon differences in culpability.l57 
The voluntary intoxication studies found a pattern of judgments 
that was broadly consistent with the legal treatment of the cases. 
Specifically, "codes commonly use negligence as the trigger point for 
the attribution of liability, and so do subjects, thus supporting the 
codes' adoption of that standard rather than one triggered by a 
higher degree of culpability."t58 However, respondents were 
considerably influenced by the degree of pre-intoxication culpability 
that the person had with respect to commission of the offense, while 
the codes typically do not consider that factor.l59 
A person is negligent if he or she disregards possible risks that 
a reasonable or prudent individual would consider. "Traditionally 
codes have treated this as an objective standard, not to be varied as 
a function of, for instance, the lower intelligence of the person whose 
conduct is being judged."l60 However, some modern codes have 
partially individualized the standard, directing the decision maker 
to take account of some personal characteristics of the offendcr.16 1 
There is no developed theory of which factors should be taken into 
account; "[i]nstead, judges (and, to a lesser extent, juries) are 
allowed to determine which attributes should be considered."162 A 
study seeking to discover which attributes subjects considered to be 
appropriate for individualization of the reasonable person standard 
gave complex results: it found both lowered and raised standards.163 
This suggests that the modern trend toward individualizing the 
objective reasonable person standard has support among the 
community. But the absence of an obvious principle tends to 
confirm the practical need for some greater guidance on the issue. 
156. Id. at 124. 
157. Id. 
158. ld. at 124; see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962) (fixing negligence as the minimum culpability requirement for 
intoxication). 
159. JLB, supra note 132, at 124. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 124-25. 
163. Id. at 125. 
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Leaving judges to decide ad hoc, as is now the case, is not likely to 
generate results consistent with community views. 
The studies show that systematic conflict with the comr~unity 
also exists within doctrines of excuse_164 While the subjects 
recognized mental incapacity as a valid basis for exculpation, they 
preferred formulations of the insanity defense that recognize both a 
control and cognitive deficit; respondents seem to conclude that 
dysfunction of either type is a valid trigger for exculpation.l65 Yet a 
majority of state codes recognize cognitive dysfunction but not 
control dysfunction as a basis for the defense.l6G 
The studies recognized duress scenarios as providing at least a 
mitigation of liability; the degree of mitigation is a function of the 
respondent's perception of the degree of coercion in the particular 
situationJ67 Codes instead set a single cut-off standard in which the 
offender either gets a full defense or full liability. Respondents used 
similar considerations to evaluate entrapment cases, rejecting as 
unimportant the Code's formulation of the defense, which requires 
that it be given only when a police agent supplies the inducement 
that leads the person to commit the crime.168 This suggests that 
they would be happy to have the entrapment defense disappear as a 
separate defense, and be subsumed under the duress defense.l69 
Studies found that respondents' intuitions about the 
appropriate grading for different variants of offenses differ from 
those reflected in the modern legal codes.170 For example, 
respondents regarded forcible rapes as similar in grade irrespective 
of the parties' prior relationship, while the Code varies the offense 
grade by prior relationship.l71 With regard to felony murder, 
respondents preferred what might be termed a "felony-
manslaughter rule" (with a standard "accomplice discount") rather 
than the modern approach that extends murder liability to all 
participants.l72 
It is clear that respondents agreed with the general tendency in 
modern legal codes to distinguish grades of offenses within as well 
as between offenses, and typically favored additional grading 
distinctions not made by the Code. For example, in causation 
studies, subjects graded various causal contributions to a death 
differently, assigning less liability to persons who intended to kill 
but did not succeed in directly doing so, although death later occ..:urs 
164. For a fuller discussion, see id. at ch. 5. 
165. Id. at 155. 
166. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW 369 (2d ed. 
2011). 
167. JLB, supra note 132, at 155. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. For further discussion, see id. at ch. 6. 
171. Id. at 197. 
172. Id. 
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in some more indirect way.l73 The subjects' interest in more specific 
grading also is similar to their conflict with the tendency of modern 
codes toward dichotomous judgments as compared to the 
respondents' more continuous judgments. As noted above, they see 
the degree of contribution in complicity, or how far the offender has 
progressed in an attempt, or the strength of the causal connection in 
homicide cases as grounds for adjusting liability along a continuum, 
as opposed to the law's judgment to set a fixed point on the 
continuum that will judge the conduct to be either complicity or not, 
an attempt or not, full causal accountability or none. 
The problems of sentencing for multiple offenses also suggest a 
structural change in current law. Presently, multiple offenses 
typically are dealt with either by concurrent sentences, which 
impose no additional sentence for a second offense, or by a 
consecutive sentence, which effectively doubles the penalty. 
Respondents, in contrast, assigned sentences for a second offense 
that added to but did not double the sentence for the first offense, 
and continued this pattern for further offenses. Their approach 
matches that of the United States Sentencing Commission 
guidelines.174 If the law were to better reflect community views, 
that approach would be more widely adopted. 
C. The Problem of Perception 
Perceptions mediate the normative force of procedural fairness 
and empirical desert, but perceptions, of course, may be wrong. By 
way of historical example, trials by ordeal and other irrational 
modes of adjudication were probably considered legitimate during 
the early Middle Ages, even though they almost certainly were 
not.17 5 
In other words, the legitimacy project for its part does not 
actually demand that procedures be fair, only that they appear to 
be. And the moral credibility project for its part does not actually 
require that substantive rules produce just 1·esults, in a 
transcendent sense, only that they reflect people's shared moral 
intuitions. An element of relativism thereby creeps in: there may be 
moral truth about the distributive justice of a given rule or the 
fairness of a given procedure, but popular perceptions of fairness and 
justice may be otherwise. 17S In this way, the emphasis on perception 
173. Id. at 198. 
174. Id. at 199. 
175. See generally Rebecca V. Colman, Reason and Unreason in Early 
Medieval Law, 4 J. lNTERDISC. HIST. 571 (1974) (discussing the importance of 
trial by ordeal as divine judgment); Ian C. Pilarczyk, Between a Rock and a Hot 
Place: The Role of Subjectivity and Rationality in the Medieval Ordeal by Hot 
Iron, 25 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 87, 87-92, 106-112 (1996) (describing the procedure 
of the ordeal and finding it well suited to the Middle Ages). 
176. AB Tyler and Wakslak recognized in their study of the legitimacy of 
police profiling: 
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raises three potential problems. First, a fair procedure or just rule 
may be misconstrued as unfair or unjust (false negatives). Second, 
an unfair procedure or unjust rule may be misconstrued as fair or 
just (false positives). Finally, a questionable but nontransparent 
procedure or rule may not be perceived at all. 
To some extent, these concerns may be beside the point for 
present purposes, as our principal focus is whether, when, and how 
perceptions of fairness and justice facilitate effective crime control-
that is, our focus is on the implications of perceptions, as opposed to 
their truth. In any event, one of us is highly skeptical whether 
deontological facts are operationalizable.I77 Assuming there are 
moral absolutes (a big assumption), we believe that tapping lay 
perceptions is the best (albeit imperfect) way to come closest to 
discovering them. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the potential 
for lay perceptions to fall short of the mark. This is a particular 
concern when it comes to perceptions of procedural fairness because 
they are more likely to be malleable cultural constructs and are 
therefore less likely to accurately reflect some higher truth.178 
Tn an effort to not sell short the objections, we think it 
appropriate to say a bit more about each potential problem of 
perception-that is, false negatives, false positives, and 
nontransparency. First, as to false negatives, we concede the 
inevitability of the problem. Even a credible and just government 
may commit some salient misstep, and such a blunder may trigger a 
pernicious spillover effect that leads citizens to misperceive as 
unfair or unjust even normatively defensible governmental actions, 
standards, or rules. 179 These misperceptions could thereafter lead to 
a loss of deference-for instance, the nullification of a justifiable 
prosecution or the violation of a justifiable law. Some scholars have 
posited that this is precisely what happened domestically during the 
Vietnam conflict: frustrations with the government's foreign policies 
contributed to the counterculture's perception that the nation's drug 
laws were simjlarly unjust)SO 
The quality of interpersonal treatment is not necessarily an indicator 
of the manner in which police make decision1:>. We can imagine an 
officer who is not a neutral decision maker, but still treats people with 
dignity and respect. At the same time we can imagine an oflicer who 
is a neutral decision maker, but treats people without dignity and 
respect. Yet people do not treat these two issues as distinct. 
Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 277. 
177. Robinson, supra note 19, at 1838. 
178. It is not, however, a concern exclusive to perceptions of procedural 
justice, as indicated by previous generations' misguided moral convictions 
concerning the perceived inferiority of racial minorities. 
179. Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of 
Moral Violations on Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1239 
(2008). 
180. C{. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 4. 
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Second, the reverse-false positives-may also exist. Under 
some circumstances, the most problematic forms of racial profiling 
may implic~te the danger. Specifically, consider the example of an 
officer who stops and searches an in.dividual after drawing 
unwarranted inferences of culpability based solely on skin color. 
Imagine further that the officer employs a soft tone and exhibits a 
gentle demeanor. For obvious reasons, courteousness is 
commendable, but the fear is that the officer may use polite words 
and kind manner to manipulate the subtler aspects of police-citizen 
interactions to create a false perception that she is not engaged in 
racial profiling, even when she is.l81 In short, one set of legitimate 
practices may mask others that potentially are illegitimate. Put 
differently, police may play professional and unprofessional 
practices off of one another. As Tyler and Wakslak found: 
[P]olice behavior shapes the attributions people make .... 
Those who believe that the police are neutral are less likely to 
feel profiled... . Those who experience high quality 
interpersonal treatment-politeness, respect, acknowledgment 
of their rights-are also less likely to feel that they have been 
profiled.1s2 
This tendency of people to confuse respectful policing for 
unbiased policing may be good for police and even for public safety, 
particularly if profiling is a somewhat intractable product of 
unconscious motivation, but it is not categorically good to the degree 
we are committed to more than just normative crime control-to the 
degree we care also about the fairness and equity of police 
procedures in reality. 
This is not to say that police should succumb to rude or abrasive 
impulses. It is desirable for police to be courteous, but not when 
civility is window dressing; it is desirable for police to give reasons 
for actions, but not when reasons are pretexts. It is, therefore, 
somewhat chilling that certain legitimacy advocates endorse steps 
like "mitigat[ing] by courteous behavior and an explanation" stops of 
people who "have done nothing wrong."183 Such advice amounts to 
the perceptual tail wagging the dog. If police stop people for doing 
nothing wrong, we should look for feasible ways to minimize that 
practice, not to merely change public perceptions of it. We should 
want normatively troubling police conduct exposed, not hidden. 
Moreover, in this context, false perceptions of procedural fairness 
181. Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 253 ("[T]he fairness with which the 
police exercise their authority influences whether members of the public view 
the police as profiling."). 
182. Id. at 259. 
183. Heather Mac Donald, Face Facts on Frisks, N.Y. Po~T (May 19, 2009, 
3:1 fi AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinionfopedcolumnists/item 
_EB3eFdXw YOuojyH5PeJHhi. 
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may prove particularly harmful because perceptions of fairness 
(unlike moral intuitions) would seem to be more often culturally 
constructed and accordingly potentially polarizing. Specifically, a 
social group that has grown accustomed to inordinate police stops 
may perceive racial profiling where another group perceives polite 
policing.I84 No matter who is right in a given case, the consequences 
are divisive. 
But what if the public is aware of racial profiling yet approves of 
it? As indicated, we think (but do not know definitively) that this is 
not the case. We believe that the public shares the Court's 
perspective that racial discrimination demands a special 
justification-what the Court refers to as strict scrutiny.185 Indeed, 
we suspect that it is precisely for this reason that police are so 
unwilling to acknowledge racial profiling. That is, police recognize 
that the public typically perceives the practice to be illegitimate, 
even if it is sometimes (or even typically) instrumentally effective. 
But, as indicated, perceptions are elastic and may change over 
time.l86 For instance, in the wake of, say, future terrorist attacks or 
immigration crises, a majority may come to more firmly tolerate or 
even welcome profiling.187 In such circumstances, popular 
considerations of systemic legitimacy may fail adequately to 
constrain excessive state power. On this reading, approval of racial 
profiling could describe a false positive in the face of more pressing 
antisubordination and countermajoritarian principles. In this way, 
genuine invidious practices may illustrate the outer-bounds of 
normative theories that permit popular intuition to shape criminal 
justice policy. 
There are examples of adjudicative false positives as well. For 
instance, a defense attorney may successfully push an ill-advised 
and self-serving plea deal on her client simply by communicating 
persuasively and politely and thereby cloaking self-dealing in a 
professional facade. 1811 By way of further example, several 
academics have recommended reforms (which we endorse) intended 
to grant crime victims greater opportunity to be heard,189 But there 
184. Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 267-68. 
185. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995). 
186. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
187. Huq et al., supra note 93, at 419 ("People have normative and political 
judgments about terror that diverge from their judgments about crime."); see 
also supra note 89 and accompanying text. . 
188. Casper et al., supra note 1, at 498 (finding significant correlation 
between defendant perceptions of legitimacy and time spent discussing case 
with lawyer). The problem with this is akin to the sick patient who gives high 
marks to the substandard doctor with exemplary bedside manner but pursues a 
malpractice suit against the brusque doctor with superior medical skill. 
189. See, e.g., Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: 
Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 350-53 (advocating the 
passage of the federal Crime Victims' Rights Amendment to provide additional 
trial rights and protections to the victims of crimes). 
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are sound reasons-most notably, efficiency and equal 
treatmentl90-to provide victims with only a "voice" and not with 
guarantees of "decision controL"1 9 1 From the standpoint of the 
legitimacy project, this is not a problem: "voice" procedures enhance 
perceptions of legitimacy, irrespective of whether the voices are 
heeded.192 Concretely, "process control" is all that matters-that is, 
the ability to shape the manner in which information is conveyed to 
the decision maker .193 But when an adjudicative procedure has no 
potential to affect outcome, the perception that it is fair may be 
chimerical. The argument here is that such a procedure does little 
more than exploit the cognitive biases that lead people to believe 
that merely by participating they can affect uncontrollable events.l94 
Of course, a ready response to this is that victim impact statements 
and similar reforms do, in fact, have at least the capacity (albeit not 
the authority) to affect adjudicatory decisions. But we should at 
least be cognizant of the concern that a preference for "process 
control" may create opportunities for legal authorities to package 
procedures and practices in perceptually appealing ways, even if the 
packages are empty in fact. 195 Put simply, seemingly fair and just 
procedures may just serve institutional ends at the expense of 
fairness and justice. 
Another false positive may be found in the administration of 
juvenile justice in the years before the Court's influential decision in 
In re Gault, which extended many constitutional procedural rights 
to respondents in delinquency hearings.196 Significantly, the Court 
noted that juvenile courts had come to adopt arbitrary and unfair 
procedures by propagating a hollow perception of the proceeding as 
"one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of 
190. A concern that implicates legitimacy in its own right. 
191. See generally infra Part IV (exploring good-faith reasons to deviate from 
perceptions of fair procedures and practices). 
192. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 1, at 77, 119-22. 
193. Folger, supra note 16; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
194. For instance, studies have shown that even though individuals lack 
control over random dice rolls, they are willing to pay a premium to bet on their 
own future dice rolls over guesses at the past rolls of others. Chip Heath & 
Amos Tversky, Preference and Belief· Ambiguity and Competence in Choice 
Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 8 (1991). 
195. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, there may be no there, there. GERTRUDE 
STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1937). Indeed, one study found that even 
strong victims' rights laws had no discernible impact on plea negotiations and 
guilty pleas beyond keeping victims aware of the substance and timing of court 
proceedings. MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRtMINAL PROCEDURES 1161 
(3d ed. 2007). This finding is consistent with Susan Bandes' observation that 
prosecutors resist reforms that interfere with their agenda. Susan Bandes, 
Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331, 333 (1999). 
196. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice 
and admonition."197 
At a macro-level, the greatest risk of false positives undoubtedly 
arises out of corrupt governments that are erroneously perceived to 
be fair and just. An unjust society will perceive its unjust 
procedures and rules to be just-even where these procedures and 
rules merely reproduce that society's backward worldview. Put 
differently, bankrupt intuitions may do nothing to check bankrupt 
institutions. To the extent that people buy into the illogic and 
injustice of, say, a fascist or racist system-such as Nazi Germany 
or the Jim Crow South-levels of deference remain unaffected (at 
least among the unsubordinated classes). 
Do the dangers of false negatives and positives mean that we 
should abandon empirical desert and legitimacy? Not at all. In the 
first instance, people's intuitions are probably right far more often 
than they are wrong. In any event, the fact that perceptions may be 
wrong weighs in favor of pursuing both projects in an effort to 
increase the likelihood that they will not only foster normative crime 
control but that they will check each other's work. Ideally, citizens 
may come to reject a corrupt regime's procedures as illegitimate, 
even if they erroneously perceive its liability and punishment rules 
to be just. Or they may come to reject its rules as unjust even if they 
erroneously perceive its means to be fair. This underscores an 
intriguing fact: perfect deference may be undesirable because it is 
through disobedience and not deference that the legitimacy and 
moral credibility of the state are testedJ98 Instances of lawlessness 
force the unjust state to advertise its immorality and injustice, and 
they provide the just state with opportunities to demonstrate the 
normative worth of its rules and institutions. 
Third, and finally, legitimacy and moral credibility have no 
normative force if the public fails to even perceive the rule or 
procedure in question. This is less of a concern with liability and 
punishment rules than with policing and adjudicatory procedures 
because substantive rules tend to be more transparent than 
procedures. 199 And this is less of a concern with policing than with 
adjudication because people have more contact with police than 
courts. Still, there are concerns. For example, we have raised a 
number of potentially illegitimate, low-visibility procedures, 
standards, and rules-statutes of limitations, the exclusionary rule, 
standing requirements, speedy-trial rules, exhaustion doctrines, 
197. Id. at 26 (observing that due process must honor not just "the 
appearance" but also "the actuality of fairness, impartiality, and orderliness"). 
198. Nicholas A. Curott & Alexander Fink, Bandit Heroes: Social, Mythical, 
or Rational?, AM. J. ECON. & Soc. (forthcoming) ("[B]anditry provides a system 
of checks and balances on state power."). 
199. Cf Bibas, supra note 119 (exploring lack of transparency in 
adjudicative procedures). 
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peremptory challenges, and Alford pleas. But, ultimately, any 
arguments about the normative authority of empirical desert and 
procedural fairness with respect to these procedures, standards, and 
rules must be tempered by the fact that the general public may not 
even be aware that they exist. 
III. PRODUCING DEFERENCE 
Certainly, fairness and justice are worthwhile independent of 
their consequences, but these values are all the more desirable if 
they also facilitate effective crime control. Does a system's 
reputation for being fair and doing justice make the system more 
successful at fighting crime? What evidence exists to support claims 
of such positive practical effects? 
A. The Effects of Undermining Legitimacy 
The advantages of producing deference are obvious, and 
legitimacy is a particularly appealing mechanism to achieve the 
objective because perceptions of legitimacy possess the potential to 
produce deference broadly. A populace that finds its legal 
authorities and institutions to be legitimate ought to be likelier to 
acquiesce to even those rules and enforcement measures that fail to 
generate categorical (or even very much) support. 
The bulk of studies drawing this link between perceptions of 
legitimacy and deference have examined the question through the 
lens of police practices. For example, Tyler has found that racial 
profiling affects compliance among minorities, but not among 
whites, who are less likely to perceive the practice.zoo Another study 
found that even garden-variety police unprofessionalism may affect 
deference. Specifically, John McCluskey found that police are more 
likely to generate compliance when they interact with individuals 
courteously and patiently.20l Likewise, McCulskey linked forceful 
entry tactics with noncompliance and noncooperation-an important 
finding that calls into question the efficacy of hard-nosed police 
tactics such as "blue swarming," in which police use strength in 
numbers to compel compliance, rather than politely soliciting 
cooperation through even-toned requests.202 
200. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
201. McCLUSKEY, supra note 17, at 171 ("As police seek more information 
from citizens they become more likely to comply. Police respect enhances 
compliance, and police disrespect diminishes compliance."). 
202. Id. at 43 ("[T]he method of entry is an important factor in determining 
the outcome of police"citizcn encounters .... [F]orceful entry tactics were 
significant predictors of noncompliance." (citation omitted)); Stephen D. 
Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public's Response to Specific 
Police Requests, 33 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 269, 290 (1996) (noting that a 
friendly approach "was significantly more likely to produce a compliant 
response than a forceful entry, but otherwise there appears to be no particular 
stylistic tendency that accounts for the greater success of experienced and pro· 
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These and other studies provide robust support for the null 
hypothesis that perceptions of legitimacy do, in fact, correlate with 
higher levels of cooperation and lower rates of recidivism.2os But 
questions of causation remain open, and confounding variables may 
exist. For instance, in Tyler's seminal study, subjects were asked to 
self-report both their perceptions of the criminal justice system and 
their commission of petty offenses.204 From the results, Tyler 
inferred a link between perception and compliance.2°5 The inference 
is no doubt strong, but, of course, it could be that law-abiding 
respondents are likelier to perceive the criminal justice system to be 
fair. Or it could be that the respondents with less faith in the 
criminal justice system were more willing to self-report violations, 
but not necessarily likelier to commit them. Tyler mitigated these 
concerns by using a longitudinal study design that measures 
deference at two points (as compared to a cross-sectional study that 
would have provided only a snapshot in time), but the concerns, 
nonetheless, remain.206 
A separate study similarly found that individuals were less 
likely to recidivate if they perceived their arrests to be legitirnate.207 
But, as stated before, it could be that people who perceive arrests to 
be legitimate are also people for whom misconduct is aberrational. 
Again, the causal arrows may flow the other way: subjective 
perceptions of legitimacy may be produced by moral commitment to 
law and legal authorities-not vice versa. 208 Or it could be that 
police officers act differently toward agreeable suspects (those who 
community policing officers"); id. at 295 ("That the number of officers present 
decreases the probability of compliance is striking given that shows of force by 
'blue swarming' are specifically intended to secure compliance with minimum 
resistance."); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
203. TYLER, WPOL, supra note t; Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair 
Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAw 
& Soc'y REv. 163, 170 (1997); Reisig et al., supra note 11, at 1024; Michael D. 
Reisig, John D. McCluskey, Stephen D. Mastrofski & William Terrill, Suspect 
Disrespect Toward the Police, 21 JUST. Q. 241 (2004); Michael D. Reisig & 
Gorazd Mesko, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Prisoner Misconduct, 15 
PSYCHOL. CRlME & L. 41, 41-49 (2009); Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 1; Tyler & 
Fagan, supra note 1. 
204. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1; see also Reisig ct al., supra note 12, at 
1024 (finding that study "participants with higher legitimacy scores reported 
higher levels of compl-iance with the law"). 
205. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1. 
206. I d.; Tyler & Fagan, supra note 1 (using similar methodology to find link 
between legitimacy and cooperation). In a later study, Tyler further mitigated 
the problems of self-reporting by using police reports as the dependent variable. 
Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidivism: 
The Engagement of Offenders' Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE 
Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & Soc'y REV. 553 (2007). 
207. See generally Paternoster et al., supra note 197. 
20S. Paternoster controlled for internal attributes in some ways but not 
others. For instance, he asked whether respondents were members of 
community or religious organizations. ld. at 178. 
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exhibit decency, contrition, or congeniality), and these suspects 
thereafter perceive their interactions with police to be legitimate. If 
these internal attributes correlate with deference to law and legal 
authorities, then fair treatment may be incidental to recidivism 
rates. 
Additionally, some commentators have highlighted high rates of 
acquittal in certain poor and minority communities-the so-called 
"Bronx Jury" phenomenon-as evidence that negative systemic 
perceptions translate to diminished willingness to cooperate with 
legal authorities.209 But higher acquittal rates do not necessarily 
represent lawless jury nullification; they may simply reflect good-
faith application of a legally defensible (albeit distinct) culturally 
constructed conception of what constitutes proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 21 0 And even if historically disadvantaged groups 
do, in fact, nullify at higher rates, uncooperative juror conduct may 
not be motivated by perceptions of procedural unfairness; it could be 
a product of perceptions of substantive injustice or something else 
entirely. 211 
Finally, as indicated, with respect to order-maintenance 
policing, academics claim (with fair intuitive support) that heavy-
handed police tactics have engendered backlash in some 
predominately poor and minority neighborhoods. 21 2 Yet crime rates 
have dropped dramatically during the same period, including (and 
often especially) in many of these same neighborhoods. It could be, 
then, that perceptions of illegitimacy have had little or no effect.213 
209. Amy Waldman, Diallo Case Tests Bron..'t Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
17, 1999, at B1 (explaining that Bronx jurors "do not trust the police" and 
consequently convict five to fifteen percent less frequently than jurors in other 
parts of the city); Butler, supra note 85, at 678-79, 695 & nn.73-74. See 
generally William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 
1827 & n. 77 (1998) (noting phenomenon of juror holdouts to avoid convicting 
Mrican American men, and noting anecdotally that holdouts tend to be African 
American women); Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial 
Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1260 n.21 (1994) (noting a 
juror letter indicating that the jury "didn't want to send anymore Young Black 
Men to Jail"); Chris Herring, Bronx Acquittals Set Record, WALL ST. J., May 4, 
2010, at A24. 
210. Dan Kahan, David Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You 
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive flliberalism, 122 
HARv. L. REV. 837 (2009) (observing that. perceptions of reasonableness are 
culturally constructed); Nancy Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 877, 900-01 (1999). 
211. Cf. Butler, supra note 85, at 719 (encouraging African American jurors 
to nullify based on the immorality of both drug laws and drug enforcement). 
212. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
213. More generally, public opinion polls consistently have shown little 
confidence in the fairness or effectiveness of our criminal justice system. See 
Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 123, 123 
(2008). Nevertheless, crime rates remain at historic lows, which may indicate 
that perceptions of legitimacy have minimal, or at least, secondary normative 
effect on levels of deference, and that other factors-for instance, moral 
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Or it could be that crime declines would have been substantially 
greater had it not been for perceptions of procedural injustice. Or it 
could be that, as an initial matter, order-maintenance policing is not 
in fact perceived to be illegitimate or that it has had no discernible 
effect on the crime decline one way or another.214 We simply do not 
have certain answers to these questions. 
Perhaps most importantly, many legitimacy studies fail to get to 
the specific question of deference in the first instance. Instead, they 
measure only satisfaction with the law or legal authorities and 
extrapolate from there.zrs The inductive leap from satisfaction to 
deference is strong, but it is still a leap. Perception is one transitive 
step removed from compliance with law and cooperation with legal 
authorities. Other studies fail to parse out what precisely is meant 
by deference. Specifically, perceptions of legitimacy may influence 
compliance with substantive law, or they may facilitate cooperation 
with enforcement and adjudication procedures, or they may do both, 
or they may do neither. And a lack of cooperation itself may be 
sliced into weak or strong versions: apathy or outright defiance. The 
better studies consider the question of deference directly, but even 
some of these studies base their findings solely on self-reports of 
how respondents think they would respond to hypothetical unfair 
treatment.216 
Ultimately, then, for all the research indicating that 
procedurally just treatment enhances systemic approval, there is 
less to indicate that legitimate procedures do, in fact, influence rates 
of compliance with substantive legal rules and cooperation with 
legal authorities.217 But we should not be too cynical. Claims of 
deference may be nonfalsifiable, but in settings where public-policy 
choices must be made, policy makers may be wise to assume that 
perceptions of legitimacy do have a sizable effect on rates of 
compliance and cooperation (at least in some settings). If nothing 
else, Tyler's central premise is appealing and intuitively sound as a 
matter of pure analytic reasoning: "If people view compliance with 
credibility, incapacitation, conventional deterrence, economic prosperity, or 
mere cyclical trends-may play equal or greater roles in predicting compliance 
and cooperation. 
214. Compare WILLIAM J. BRATTON, TURNAROUND: How M1ERICA'S TOP COP 
REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998), with BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF 
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 3--5 (2001) 
(questioning link between order-maintenance policing and crime decline). 
215. Tyler et al., supra note 28, at 54; Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper & 
Bonnie Fisher, Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of 
Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 629, 639 
(1989). 
216. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1415 (2005) 
(finding that people exposed to injustice expressed willingness to commit low-
level offenses). 
217. Cf Reisig et al., supra note 11 (observing that results were unclear 
whether legitimacy promoted deference more than distributive fairness). 
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the law as appropriate because of their attitudes about how they 
should behave, they will voluntarily assume the obligation to follow 
legal rules. They will feel personally committed to obeying the law, 
irrespective of whether they risk punishment for breaking the 
law."218 
B. The Effects of Undermining Moral Credibility 
What evidence exists that differences in the criminal law's 
moral credibility with the community will track differences in the 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system? The most obvious hint 
may come from common sense. If citizens see the criminal justice 
system as unjust, what motivation would they have to assist it-
volunteering as a witness, assisting investigations and 
enforcement-or to defer to it-following its rules even when 
prosecution is unlikely, following the jury instructions given, joining 
in the stigmatization of conduct labeled criminal even when its 
condemnab11ity is unclear, or internalizing the societal norms that 
criminal law embodies? Common sense tells us that people are more 
likely to resist and subvert a criminal justice system that they see as 
unjust than they are to assist and defer to it. 219 
218. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 3; see also Nadler, supra note 210, at 
1405 ("When a particular criminal rule conflicts with the moral intuitions of the 
governed community, the power of the criminal law as a whole to induce 
compliance is in jeopardy because it is no longer viewed as a trustworthy source 
of information regarding which actions are moral and which are not."). 
Countless anecdotal examples underscore the insight. For example, one of us 
recently interviewed a man named Greg Fairchild, a young Mrican American 
professor at the University of Virginia's Darden School of Business. Several 
years ago, Fairchild was followed home by a police officer. Shaken by the 
possibility that he had been profiled, Fairchild contacted the department, and a 
meeting was soon arranged between Fairchild and the Chief of Police. Fairchild 
was cynical about the prospects for a productive dialogue. However, the Police 
Chief did not stonewall; instead, he expressed empathy and frankly admitted 
that the officer may have acted in a normatively problematic manner. The 
Chief identified the officer who had tailed Fairchild, and he relayed the officer's 
stated reason for doing so. Fairchild was not entirely satisfied with the reason, 
buL his anger had abated. Ultimately, Fairchild would come to assist the 
department by joining its foundation's board. Remarkably, local lawyers had 
previously approached Fairchild about sitting on the very same board, but, at 
that time, Fairchild had declined. Fairchild reported: "The only reason I 
reconsidered joining the board is because of the way the Chief handled the 
circumstances. It absolutely did influence my comfort level." Thus, by 
accommodating Fairchild, the Chief had succeeded not only in defusing a 
contentious situation, but also in making an ally of an influential community 
member. Of course, the Chief might never have met with Fairchild were it not 
for the professor's standing in the community. But, by doing so, the Chief had 
reshaped Fairchild's perceptions of legitimacy and had facilitated future 
cooperation and collaboration. Interview with Greg Fairchild, Professor, Univ. 
ofVa. Darden Sch. of Bus., in Charlottesville, Va. (July 10, 2010). 
219. The insight is not a new one. As Holmes observed: "(A] law which 
punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of 
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Anecdotal evidence supports this commonsense view. The 
notoriously unjust Soviet criminal justice system, ruled by coercion 
and threat and tainted by politics and ideology, earned little moral 
credibility (or legitimacy) with the public.22o As Peter Solomon 
concludes, "Soviet experience demonstrates that indiscriminate and 
coercive use of the criminal law approaching naked repression 
discredits both the law and the regime that sponsors it."22 1 Russian 
crime rates increased under Soviet rule.222 Further, when 
overwhelming state control was lost with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, crime spiked.223 Having destroyed its moral credibility with 
the community, the system had little ability to control conduct 
through the forces of social or normative influencc.224 
the community would be too severe for that community to bear." HOLMES, 
supra note 111, at 50; see also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957) 
(quoting Holmes). 
220. See, e.g., Robert A. Kushen, The Death Penalty and the Crisis of 
Criminal Justice in Russia, 19 BROOK. J. lNT'L L. 523 (1993); PETER H. 
SOLOMON, SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STALIN (1996). 
221. SoLOMON, supra note 214, at 463. Solomon continues: 
ld. 
During the collectivization campaign Soviet legal officials reduced the 
use of legal procedures to the point where their actions resembled 
those of other agents of police and local power. As a result the 
authority and status of law was called into question, and much effort 
expended later on to restore the law to its normal footing. Less 
obviously, this account of the history of criminal justice under Stalin 
reveals that in an authoritarian regime the criminal sanction was also 
limited by capacity for enforcement. When Stalin tried to use the 
criminal law for purposes and in ways not accepted by its enforcers 
(legal officials, police, and others) or call for penalties that struck 
them as too severe, the result was evasion, resistance, and 
inconsistent enforcement. These consequences followed Stalin's 
extensions of the criminal law (e.g., to the policing of defective goods 
production and the regulation of the labor force); his recriminalization 
of old offenses (abortion and juvenile delinquency); and his mandating 
of the sharp increases in punishment for theft (in 1932 and in 1947). 
The point is that even a dictator whose authority is not limited by 
institutional checks faces limitations on his power stemming from the 
capacity of his government to enforce his decisions. 
222. See, e.g., Andrew Stickley & Ilkka Henrik Makinen, Homicide in the 
Russian Empire and Soviet Union: Continuity or Change?, 45 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 647, 658 (2005). 
223. See, e.g., JONATHA.Jo.,j WEILER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA: A DARKER SIDE 
OF REFORM 2 (2004); Christopher T. Ruder, Individual Rights Under the New 
Russian Constitution: A Practical Framework for Competitive Capitalism or 
Mere Theoretical Exercise?, 39 ST. Lours U. L.J. 1429, 1156 n.156 (1995) 
(discussing sharp increase in crime); Jane Weaver, Are Institutions Doing Their 
Job? Kleptocracy and Democracy, 90 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 83 (1996) 
(discussing rampant crime in Russia). 
224. One might point to American Prohibition as a related example. Once 
the criminal justice system lost its moral credibility with a public that routinely 
drank alcohol, it lost it normative force with them in areas other than alcohol 
consumption. Crime rates rose generally. See CHARLES HANSON TOWNE, THF. 
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What recent research has shown is that this effect is not limited 
to instances of dramatically bad reputations, as in the Soviet Union. 
Even minor changes in moral credibility incrementally affect 
people's willingness to acquiesce, assist, and defer to the criminal 
law. One technique used in social science research on such issues is 
an experiment in which subjects are told of injustices in the current 
criminal justice system that they did not previously know about, and 
are then tested to see whether the new information changes their 
view of the system and their willingness to assist and defer to it. 
Obviously the subjects came to the experiment with decades of prior 
information about the system-its operation is a common feature of 
news reports-and they no doubt had a pre-existing view as to the 
system's moral credibility. Within this context, there is a limit to 
how much an experimenter can change a subject's view in the brief 
period of the experiment. Yet, the studies show that even 
incremental changes in perceptions of justness can and do 
incrementally change people's willingness to assist and to defer. 
In the most recent and direct study,225 researchers exposed 
adult subjects to a range of real-world cases relying upon modern 
crime-control doctrines that produced results inconsistent with the 
subjects' notions of justice. Subjects' willingness to assist and to 
defer when faced with a number of specific kinds of situations was 
tested before and after this exposure.226 Subjects were asked, for 
example, whether they would report various offenses by other 
persons; turn in evidence to the police; report their own accidental 
violation; conclude that the prohibition of certain conduct by the law 
meant that the conduct was in fact morally condemnable; or 
conclude that the law's imposition of a serious penalty meant that 
the conduct at issue was in fact morally condemnable.227 In a 
separate study, the same researchers tested the same willingness of 
subjects to assist and to defer by using two random groups: one that 
had been exposed to the unjust cases and one that had not.zzs Both 
studies showed similar results: subjects exposed to the unjust cases 
were less willing to assist and to defer to the criminallaw.229 
RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION: THE Hm,1AN SIDE OF WHAT THE EIGHTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE VOLSTEAD ACT HAVE DONE TO THE UNITED STATES 161, 
156-62 (1923) (reciting the statistics on significant crime rate increases for 
homicide, burglary, and public disorderly and drunkenness offenses); Mark 
Thornton, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS No. 157, ALCOHOL PROHIBITION WAS A 
FAILURE 1, 5-8 (July 17, 1991) (reciting crime rate increase statistics, noting 
that "crime increased and became 'organized'; the court and prison systems 
were stretched to the breaking point; and corruption of public officials was 
rampant"). 
225. Robinson et al., supra note 3. 
226. See id. (exploring individuals' attitudes surrounding the criminal 
justice system and their willingness to comply with rules of criminal law). 
227. Id. at 1999. 
228. Id. at 2004. 
229. ld. at 1995-2015. 
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Another study tested for the same effects using pre-existing 
data from large population surveys collected by others. Existing 
national databases were examined to see what, if any, relation the 
system's moral credibility had on the effective operation of the 
criminal justice system.23° One large national survey database 
involved telephone interviews with Americans who recently 
participated in criminal court proceedings.231 Bivariate and 
multivariate statistical techniques were used to determine whether 
their responses to the survey questions were consistent with a view 
that the system's moral credibility increased their willingness to 
defer to the courts to resolve a similar case in the future.232 The 
findings support the study conclusions reported above, which is 
significant because it involves people who have actual experience 
with the criminal courts. Respondents with criminal court 
experience who viewed their community courts as morally credible 
in dealing with criminal cases (specifically those involving violence, 
drugs or alcohol, and delinquency) expressed a greater willingness 
to defer to the criminal justice system in the future.233 Subjects who 
perceived failures in the criminal justice system were significantly 
less likely to say they would defer to the system in the future. 234 
A number of previous studies, described below, confirm related 
points. Some show the existence of a relationship between an 
individual's disbelief in the morality of a particular law and his or 
her willingness to obey that law. Other studies show that the 
degree to which people report that they have obeyed a law in the 
past and plan to obey it in the future correlates with the degree to 
which they judge that law to be morally valid. Still other studies go 
further to show how perceptions of injustice might lead to more 
generalized flouting of the law. 
A number of studies have focused on how beliefs about the 
morality of a particular law can affect compliance with it. In one 
such study, Herbert Jacob showed a greater relation between 
compliance and a law's perceived moral correctness than between 
compliance and perceived likelihood of punishment for violating 
it.235 He concluded that "[t]he relationship between compliance and 
230. ld. at 2016-25. 
231. Id. at 2017-18. 
232. Id. at 2017. 
233. Id. at 2023. 
234. ld. 
235. See Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects of Formal and Informal Sanctions, 
2 LAw & PoL'Y Q. 61, 67 (1980). Jacob randomly interviewed 176 people over 
the age of eighteen from Evanston, Illinois by allowing a computer to pick 
random phone numbers. Id. at 64. The respondents were interviewed 
regarding whether they sped on highways, had smoked marijuana, and whether 
they would shoplift a fifty dollar item if no one was looking. Id. at 65. 
Marijuana smokers were the most numerous, followed by speeders, followed by 
potential shoplifters. Id. at 65-66. Two-thirds of respondents thought the fifty-
five mile-an-hour speed limit was right, three-quarters agreed that the laws 
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legitimacy [perceived moral correctness] appears to be considerably 
stronger than the one between compliance and perceptions of 
severity or certainty of sanctions."236 In another study, Grasmick 
and Green found similarly that "three independent variables-moral 
commitment, perceived threat of legal punishment and threat of 
social disapproval-appear to constitute a concise and probably 
exhaustive set of factors which inhibit illegal behavior."237 Likewise, 
Silberman's study of 14 7 undergraduates at a small private 
university, suggested that "[w]hen public sentiment in general 
disapproves [of a] given offense, it is relatively unlikely to occur. 
Similarly, serious criminal activity is less likely to occur among 
those who show a high degree of moral commitment, even though 
these individuals might commit less serious offenses."23S 
These studies demonstrate that perceptions of the moral 
correctness of particular laws can affect compliance with them. 
Other studies have gone further to show how perceptions of the 
immorality of a particular law or of some act of the criminal justice 
system can lead to more generalized effects on compliance. One, in 
against shoplifting were conect, but only one-quarter thought the law against 
marijuana was correct. Id. at 70. The results showed that for those who think 
the speeding laws are right, 62.3% comply, while only 9.8% who think it is 
wrong comply. Id. Of those who think the marijuana law is just, 85% do not 
smoke marijuana. Id. Contrastingly, only 36% of those respondents who think 
that the law is wrong complied with its ban on smoking. Id. There was no 
statistical difference in shoplifting, which is evidence of high agreement the 
shoplifting is wrong. Id. 
236. Id. at 70; see also Robert F. Meier & Weldon T. Johnson, Deterrence as 
Social Control: The Legal and Extralegal Production of Conformity, 42 AM. Soc. 
REV. 292, 301 (1977) ("The belief that marijuana use is immoral ... functions to 
inhibit marijuana use," while "legal threat ... shows a measurable, but 
essentially trivial influence on marijuana use/nonuse."). 
237. Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social 
Disapproval, and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CR1M. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 325, 334 (1980). A random sample of L100 adults was selected 
from the Polk City Directory and subsequently interviewed. Id. at 329. 
Information was gathered about the subjects' involvement in eight illegal 
activities-theft of property worth less than twenty dollars, theft of property 
worth more than twenty dollars, gambling illegally, cheating on tax returns, 
intentionally inflicting personal injury, littering, illegal use of fireworks, and 
driving under the influence. Id. at 330. The respondents were then asked to 
estimate the perceived certainty of arrest, the perceived severity of punishment, 
and their moral commitment to adhering to the given legal rule. Id. 
238. Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Deterrence, 41 AM. Soc. REV. 
442, 457 (1976). 'l'he students responded to whether they had ever committed 
certain moral or legal violations, such as assault, use of hard drugs, petty theft, 
vandalism, shoplifting, drunk and disorderly conduct, premarital sex, 
marijuana use, and drinking under age. Id. at 446. The students then 
responded to questions regarding the morality of the act, the certainty of 
punishment, the severity of punishment, and peer involvement. Id. One 
proposed hypothesis that was being tested was that "[t]he higher the degree of 
moral support for the legal regulation of an offense or offenses, the lower the 
probability that the offense or offenses will be committed." Id. at 457. 
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particular, is a recent investigation by Janice Nadler that looked at 
how knowledge of injustices by the criminal justice system can affect 
intentions to comply with the law.2:19 Nadler found that subjects 
exposed to cases that they viewed as unjust were more likely in a 
subsequent mock trial to engage in juror nullification.240 
A similar study by Greene presented unjust cases and also 
examined their effect on subjects' attitudes.241 Greene reached 
conclusions similar to Nadler's. Subjects who had read cases in 
which the legal system behaved in ways counter to their moral 
intuitions rated themselves "more likely to take steps aimed at 
changing the law, less likely to cooperate with police, more likely to 
join a vigilante or watch group, and less likely to use the law to 
guide behavior."242 He further concluded that "overall, subjects 
appeared less likely to give the law the benefit of any doubt after 
reading cases where the law was at odds with their intuitions."243 
A more recent study by Mullen and Nadler showed how the 
perception of moral injustice in the legal system can increase rates 
of deviant behavior.244 The researchers found that exposure to 
239. See Nadler, supra note 210. In one of her experiments, subjects read 
mock newspaper stories describing legislation that was perceived as either 
highly just, or highly unjust. !d. at 1411. Subjects in the unjust condition later 
reported greater intentions to engage in minor acts of law-breaking which were 
unrelated to the content of the unjust legislation, such as parking illegally, or 
making illegal copies of software. Id. at 1414-15. In a second study, conducted 
over the Internet, subjects acted as mock jurors, and had to render a verdict in 
a fictional case in which the evidence pointed to a guilty verdict. !d. at 1418, 
1423. Prior to this, they were exposed to a mock news story of a (real) crime in 
which the protagonist watched his friend abduct and rape a seven-year old girl 
in a casino. Id. at 1417, 1424. The story had two versions-one in which the 
protagonist was described as being appropriately punished (just version), and 
another in which he was not punished at all (unjust version). ld. at 1424. In 
the ensuing mock trial scenario, with unrelated content, subjects who had seen 
the unjust news story were more likely to engage m juror nullification by 
rendering a not guilty decision. Id. 
240. See id. at 1424-25. 
241. Erich J. Greene, Effects of Disagreements Between Legal Codes and 
Lay Intuitions on Respect for the Law (June 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton 
University). 
242. Id. at iv. 
243. Id. at v. 
244. See Mullen & Nadler, supra note 174. During the experimental session, 
137 undergraduates read a newspaper article that summarized the legal trial of 
a doctor who allegedly provided an unlawful late-term abortion. Id. at 1240. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to read that the defendant was found guilty or 
not guilty. Id. at 1241. One week prior to this session, subjects had completed 
a questionnaire that assessed their attitudes about abortion, and these 
attitudes were used to predict the critical dependent variable, which was 
whether subjects failed to return (i.e., stole) the pen that was provided to fill out 
their questionnaire. Id. at 1241-42. Mter subjects completed all the studies, 
they were instructed to return their pen and an envelope containing their 
materials to designated boxes. Id. at 1241. The researchers numbered the 
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outcomes that are inconsistent with a person's strongly held moral 
beliefs increases the likelihood of him or her engaging in deviant 
behavior.245 
Finally, people's common compliance with tax laws raises 
interesting issues related to these points. Large numbers of 
American citizens pay their taxes even though the penalty for tax 
evasion is not great and the probability of detection is trivial, thus, 
the expected cost of such a crime is quite small.246 For these 
reasons, many legal scholars believe that the threat of official 
sanction does not explain why such large numbers of citizens pay 
taxes.2<~7 A survey by Karyl Kinsey sheds some light on the 
underlying forces. 248 When people reported that a friend or 
coworker, after contact with the IRS, had been made to pay more 
taxes than they properly owed, the people thought the tax laws 
generally were less fair and were more likely to intend to cheat on 
their taxes in the future. Nadler, in reviewing the study, 
commented that "[t]he results of the tax study suggest that exposure 
to reports of an unjust legal outcome in a particular situation might 
lead to lower perceived fairness of the law more generally, which in 
turn can lead to noncompliance with the law in the future."249 
Taken together, these studies suggest that knowledge of 
systematic injustice produced by the criminal justice system, 
particularly when it is intentional, can have a range of deleterious 
effects on people's attitudes and on their behavior. People are less 
likely to comply with laws they perceive to be unjust. They may also 
be less likely to comply with the law generally when they perceive 
the criminal justice system as tolerating such injustice. The studies 
also show that these effects are not limited to noncompliance, but 
apply generally to undermine cooperation and assistance with the 
legal system. Further, perceptions of injustice undermining the 
system's moral credibility can also affect its ability to harness the 
normative forces of social influence and the internalization of norms. 
identical pens with ink that was only visible under ultraviolet light. Id. 
Therefore, subjects did not know that their pen was numbered but the 
experimenter was able to identify the pens that were not returned at the end of 
each experimental session. Id. The percentage of subjects who did not return 
the pen was substantially higher for those subjects who had strong pro-choice 
attitudes, and who were exposed to the guilty verdict-that is, those for whom 
the outcome clashed with their moral principles. Id. at 1242. 
245. Id. at 1244. 
246. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000). 
247. Id. 
248. See Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS 
Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX 
COMPLIA.J.'ICE AND ENFORCEMENT 259 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (exploring the 
various reasons behind individuals' compliance and noncompliance with tax 
laws). 
249. Nadler, supra note 210, at 1409-10. 
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The flip side, of course, is that if the criminal justice system reflects 
ordinary perceptions of justice, it can take advantage of a range of 
psychological mechanisms that serve to increase assistance, 
cooperation, compliance, and deference. 
IV. COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS: THE ATTRACTION OF 
UNFAIRNESS AND INJUSTICE 
Given the practical benefits that flow from building a reputation 
for fairness and justice, why has the current criminal justice system 
adopted practices, procedures, and rules that conflict with these 
values? Sometimes the reason is simply a failure to appreciate the 
detrimental effects, such as those examined in the preceding Part. 
Alternatively, those who shape the rules and practices simply may 
not realize just how unfair or unjust they are perceived to be. After 
all, there may be a disconnect between lay and professional 
perspectives, because the viewpoints of police, prosecutors, and 
judges are shaded and shaped by their professional training and 
experience.250 Put differently, what technocrats perceive to be fair 
and just is not necessarily what laypersons perceive to be fair and 
just. Criminal-justice functionaries may simply be too 
institutionalized to tap and assess their own intuitions as means to 
effectively decipher prevailing lay beliefs.2s1 
But in circumstances where experts do accurately decipher lay 
perceptions, there may be countervailing instrumental advantages 
that weigh in favor of maintaining even those procedures and rules 
that the public perceives to be unfair or unjust. In other words, 
there may be independent reasons-good-faith justifications-for 
the criminal justice system to adopt and implement procedures and 
rules that undermine lay perceptions of fairness and justice. 
Tensions are endemic to a criminal justice system that responds 
to discrete (and sometimes competing) justifications for punishment. 
For instance, incapacitation may demand longer sentences for less 
volitional actors who are more likely to recidivate. By contrast, 
desert may call for less punishment for these same people because 
250. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); see HEUMANN, supra 
note 116, at 1-4. 
251. See People v. Warren, 81 N.W. 360, 362 (1899); State v. Williams, 47 
N.C. 257, 269 (1855) (contrasting "the good sense of a jury" with the legal 
professional who "generalises, and reduces every thing to an artificial system, 
formed by study"); Bibas, supra note 119, at 931 (observing that professional 
"insiders may take too narrow a view when evaluating what factors matter to 
[lay] outsiders"); Hadar Aviram, Trapped in the Law: Legal Actors' Attitudes 
Toward Legal Practice as a Solution for Social Problems (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, UC-Berkeley) (explaining that "formal law and legal 
indoctrination" inhibit lawyers from considering "external perceptions" that fall 
outside "the legal framework within which they operate"), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/hadar_aviram/1/. 
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they lack the capacity to control their conduct. But such gulfs are 
not always unbridgeable. That is why legitimacy and moral 
credibility are such promising enterprises. Specifically, an 
expressive justice system exploits seemingly elusive common ground 
between instrumental and deontic impulses.252 By reflecting lay 
perceptions of fairness and justice, such a system does better to 
optimize crime control than a system that relies exclusively on 
conventional instrumental deterrence as a distributive principle, 
and it does better to approximate deontological desert (to the extent 
there is any such absolute) than a system that structures its rules 
and procedures around the intuitions and preferences of moral 
philosophers.253 But the common ground is, of course, not limitless, 
and hard decisions may follow. 
A. Enforcement Practices 
Consider the tradeoffs at work in setting enforcement practices. 
Keeping with the earlier example of order-maintenance policing, the 
practice carries with it a number of institutional advantages that 
stand apart from normative crime control. Specifically, order-
maintenance policing may improve the quality of life in high-crime 
areas not only by responding to the immediate disorder but also by 
facilitating a high volume of searches and arrests that help police 
discover evidence of more serious past or present crimes and compile 
a database that police may use to investigate future crimes.254 One 
of us has criticized aggressive use of order-maintenance policing as a 
low-cost, high-volume (and therefore easily over-used) mechanism to 
stop, search, and arrest.255 As indicated, it is unclear whether the 
public agrees with the criticism-that is, whether it perceives 
aggressive order-maintenance policing to be unfair and, if so, under 
what circumstances. But, significantly, even if the public agrees, its 
misapprehensions would and should not end the analysis. A final 
determination of whether and how often the approach ought to be 
252. See Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 3, at 477 (arguing 
that a justice system cannot be effective in its goal unless it shares the public's 
"overriding concern" for "doing justice"). 
253. Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 3, at 42-43. 
254. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION § 1.01, at 1-2 (5th ed. 2010) (describing "spillover" 
phenomenon whereby police enforce minor crimes as a mechanism "to expand 
police authority to investigate more serious crimes"); Bowers, supra note 244, at 
1693-99; Bowers, supra note 76, at 95-96; Rosen, supra note 75, at 26 ("Instead 
of prosecuting lower-level offenses to encourage an atmosphere of social order 
that would prevent more serious crime, [authorities] began prosecuting lower-
level offenses in order to catch more serious criminals." (emphasis added)); see, 
e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 208, at 44 (quoting NYPD Commissioner, William 
Bratton: "Every arrest was like opening a box of Cracker Jack. What kind of toy 
am I going to get? Got a gun? Got a knife? Got a warrant? ... It was 
exhilarating for the cops."). 
255. Bowers, supra note 244, at 1698--99; Bowers, supra note 76, at 120. 
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used must take into account the independent institutional police 
advantages. Ultimately, the institutional advantages of order-
maintenance policing may trump even the costs that flow from 
genuine perceptions of unfairness.256 
Moreover, a system must measure a normatively problematic 
practice against the available alternatives. For example, one of us 
has made the argument that aggressive use of order-maintenance 
policing is a less intrusive enforcement strategy than historical 
exercises of rough justice.257 Specifically, police are no longer 
permitted to crack skulls or to exploit formless loitering statutes, 
but they can lawfully stop and frisk.258 Indeed, a prominent legal 
historian has argued that the Supreme Court was aware of this 
tradeoff, holding vagrancy statutes unconstitutional only after 
formulating Terry as a viable substitute.259 On this reading, Terry 
may be an equally effective but less invasive (and therefore more 
defensible) enforcement strategy, even if the public fails to perceive 
it as such, which, as indicated, is an open question.26o 
With respect to any police practice, the core question ought to be 
whether a court appropriately balances individual liberties and 
effective law enforcement. If a court does so, then its decision is 
proper, even if the public fails to perceive that the balance is 
adequately struck. But, as discussed, effective law enforcement is 
probably undermined (at least to a degree) when the public believes 
authorities are behaving unfairly.261 Thus, perceptions are critical 
256. Certainly, policy makers believe the advantages outweigh any 
normative legitimacy costs. HARCOURT, supra note 208, at 3-5 (citing 
department heads who believe that order-maintenance policing works); Long, 
supra note 208 (quoting NYPD Commissioner, Ray Kelly: "This is a proven law 
enforcement tactic to fight and deter crime, one that is authorized by criminal 
procedure law."); Rivera et al., supra note 77 (quoting department head that 
concentrated and significant use of stop-and-frisk "had a significant impact" on 
crime reduction). 
257. Bowers, supra note 244, at 1695-97 (discussing unavailability of rough 
justice as mode of social control); Josh Bowers, The Limits of Legal Limits 
(forthcoming). 
258. Compare Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), and 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
259. RISA GOLUBOFF, PEOPLE OUT OF PLACE: 'fHE SIXTIES, THE SUI'REME 
COURT AND VAGRANCY LAW (forthcoming). 
260. One study found that individuals perceive formal arrests to be more 
legitimate than brief stops. Engel, supra note 44, at 469 (observing that 
citizens were more likely to perceive procedural injustice in traffic stops that 
resulted in citations than traffic stops that resulted in arrest); Bowers, supra 
note 244, at 1696 (noting public anxiety over stops and frisks that do not result 
in arrests). Somewhat counter-intuitively, then, individuals may favor a 
vagrancy of arrests (and consequent criminal charges) to less intrusive and 
more cursory Terry stops. 
261. See Nick Pearce, Rethinking Fairness, 14 PUB. PoL'Y REs. 11, 15 (2007) 
(detailing research which "found that a crucial factor in people's willingness to 
cooperate with law enforcement activities was the legitimacy in which the police 
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to the balance, but not necessarily determinative. For example, the 
public may disagree with the Court's ruling that police are 
authorized to arrest individuals for even nonjailable offenses. But, 
as Richard Frase has argued, officers could not so readily engage in 
order-maintenance policing without the power.262 Thus, 
independent institutional advantages may trump lay perceptions of 
unfairness. Likewise, the public may feel that the Court has been 
too deferential in delineating the permissible scope and bases for 
Terry stops and frisks. But such deference may be necessary to 
optimize crime control and, again, to effectuate order-maintenance 
policing. As stated before, the Court's constitutional focus is on the 
balance between liberty and order, 21:i3 and we think that to be the 
right focus. Our bottom line is simply that lay perceptions ought to 
matter to this balance. Thus, the Court ought to consider as a factor 
what, for example, the public thinks of pretextual stops,264 exigency 
and consent searches,265 plain-view seizures,266 and the use of 
evidence of flight and presence in high-crime neighborhoods as 
relevant to determinations of the existence of reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause.267 And, if the public disapproves of any of these 
practices, standards, and rules, then the Court probably ought to 
defer to public preferences for equally effective alternatives, 
provided such alternatives exjst. But, at the same time, the Court 
ought to endorse unpopular practices, standards, and rules where 
there are sufficient good-faith reasons to continue them. For 
instance, the Court ought not disturb lightly those practices critical 
to the nation's war on terrorism-whatever the public may think of 
the practices in question. In this way, perceptions may do their best 
work as a kind of tiebreaker. 
B. Adjudication Procedures 
Just as a system may have plausible reasons to adopt police 
practices that contravene popular perceptions of fairness, so too may 
may implement adjudicatory practices that advance some overriding 
justifiable alternative purpose that cannot effectively be served by 
were held, which in turn derived from the perception of the justice of the force's 
procedures and whether or not it treated individuals fairly''). 
262. Richard Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment 
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FoRDHAM L. REV. 329, 
350 n.97 (2002) ("[A] strategy of 'zero tolerance policing' requires and justifies 
arrests for minor crimes."). 
263. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 32; United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 
273-78 (2002); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1989); United States 
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). 
264. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
265. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). 
266. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). 
267. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
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procedures that accord narrowly with lay preferences. Concretely, 
adjudicatory ends that are "legitimate" in the colloquial sense (that 
is, defensible) may counterintuitively run up against the public's 
conceptions of legitimate (that is, procedurally fair) adjudicatory 
practices. 
To understand the conflicting values potentially at play, 
consider the exclusionary rule and other rules and standards 
intended to deter official misconduct. A system may justifiably 
settle on an exclusionary rule that deters police misconduct, even if 
people perceive the rule to provide guilty defendants with unfair 
windfalls that promote unequal treatment and underenforcement.26S 
Conversely, a system may justifiably limit the reach of an 
exclusionary rule that provides no added deterrent, even if people 
desire a more robust rule.269 Likewise, a system may justifiably 
adopt a double jeopardy rule that deters prosecutorial harassment 
or a speedy trial rule that deters prosecutorial foot-dragging, even if 
the public feels such rules are, alternatively, insufficiently or overly 
protective. The takeaway is not that perceptions of legitimacy ought 
to trump other considerations or that other considerations ought to 
trump legitimacy-only that there ought to be a balance of the 
competing objectives and values at play. And there are empirical 
questions not just about public perceptions but also about whether 
alternative instrumental ends are well served by deviating from 
public perceptions. Ultimately, then, perceptions matter, but they 
are not all that matters. The problem, at present, is that it is not 
clear whether the exclusionary rule is even perceived to be unfair 
(and, if so, in what circumstances), much less whether any 
perceptions of unfairness are outweighed by good-faith justifications 
for keeping or, alternatively, limiting or scrapping the rule. 
An apt analogy may be to the frequently drawn distinction 
between conduct and decision rules. Categorical substantive 
conduct rules are intended to shape lay behavior and reflect moral 
intuitions, while procedurally oriented decision rules are intended to 
optimally constrain state power and/or soften rigid application of 
conduct rules.270 Concretely, conduct and decision rules serve 
268. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
269. See Bilz, supra note 104; see, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 
135, 141 (2009) (refusing to apply exclusionary rule in circumstances in which 
its use does not result in "appreciable deterrence"). 
270. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAw CONVERSATIONS, supra note 3, at 
3, 7 ("By framing its imperatives in familiar language, the law echoes and 
reinforces the layperson's ordinary moral beliefs, whereas the technical legal 
definitions can effectively guide professional decision-makers.") [hereinafter 
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules 1.1]; see also Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1984) [hereinafter Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and 
Conduct Rules 1]. 
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separate values. But, critically, they must coexist in a justice 
system. Thus, the system may justifiably endorse and adopt, say, 
an exclusionary rule even if the public sharply disfavors the 
consequent Type II errors (that is, wrongful dismissals and 
acquittals). In such circumstances, legitimacy costs are the 
necessary and inevitable byproduct of "acoustic leakage" between 
desirable conduct rules that track lay intuitions and (otherwise) 
desirable decision rules that effectively cabin authority and 
facilitate individualized adjudication.zn 
The exclusionary rule is but one example of an adjudicatory 
procedure that may be justifiably kept or discarded for reasons 
independent of lay perceptions of fairness. The following is a rough-
and-ready (and far from exhaustive) list of additional examples of 
potentially defensible adjudicatory rules, standards, and practices 
that, nevertheless, may deviate from public perceptions of fairness. 
First, a well-functioning justice system almost certainly must abide 
some amount of Type I error (that is, wrongful conviction), even if 
people find fair only an evidentiary standard of proof beyond all 
doubt.272 Second, a system may justifiably consider the 
psychological harm to a child victim of sex abuse, even if people 
perceive it to be unfair to restrict the ability of a defendant to 
confront his accuser face-to-face.273 Third, a system may permit 
271. Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules I, supra note 264, at 
652; see also Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules II, supra note 264, 
at 3-11 (describing the "gap" created "between legal and moral obligation" as 
"the inevitable price" to be paid by a system that wishes to maximize crime 
control but minimize the reach of state power). Such legitimacy costs can, 
however, be minimized. The system ought to avoid adopting or implementing 
standards that disingenuously purport to express public perceptions when in 
fact they serve alternative ends. A case in point is the Court's strained 
application of the ostensible reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Florida 
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (permitting helicopter surveillance); United States 
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (permitting remote tracking of vehicles); United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (permitting dog sniffs); see also William J_ 
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 444 
(1995) (describing the Court's application of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy as "implausibl[e)," "ridiculous," and "irrational"). If the system is to 
contravene lay intuitions (as it sometimes must), then it ought to do so 
honestly. 
272. See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust 
Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 92 (1999) (discussing the evidence 
that wrongful convidion is an "unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the 
routine operation of the criminal justice system" and proposing various 
remedies for those proven wrongfully convicted). 
273. By way of further example, studies have shown that restorative justice 
practices-like circle sentencing-promote perceptions of systemic legitimacy 
and provide stakeholders a measure of "process control." Nevertheless, a court 
may reject the practices as inefficient and as insufficiently attentive to core 
questions of guilt and innocence. Erik Luna, CRIMINAL LAw CONVERSATIONS, 
supra note 3, at 594 (conceding that restorative justice cannot address 
"whodunit" questions). 
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lawyers to make unfettered nondiscriminatory peremptory 
challenges to help ensure that impartial juries are empaneled.274 
Fourth, a system may procedurally bar defendants and convicts 
from pursuing many types of innocence claims to promote finality, 
certainty, efficiency, and rule utility.275 Fifth, a system may prohibit 
trial jurors from learning sentencing consequences pre-verdict to 
advance rule-of-law considerations and to minimize nullification 
concerns.276 Sixth, a system may exclude victims from the 
adjudicatory process to promote efficiency, professionalism, and 
uniform decision-making. 277 
Finally, no analysis of procedural rules and standards would be 
complete without considering plea bargaining-the most prevalent 
adjudicatory practice in American criminal justice. Plea bargaining 
promotes certainty, autonomy, and, even perhaps, proportionality in 
an age in which determinate sentencing laws are insufficiently 
tailored to desert.278 More than anything else, plea bargaining 
facilitates the efficient resolution of criminal cases-a benefit that is 
not just desirable but perceived to be necessary in a criminal justice 
system that features high caseloads, costly rules of procedure, and 
inadequate resources to provide trials to even a sizable fraction of 
defendants.279 Indeed, the instrumental arguments in favor of plea 
bargaining are so powerful that many critics have abandoned efforts 
to abolish the institution.280 As such, the legitimacy project's better 
focus may be targeted reforms of discrete plea-bargain practices that 
the public may find to be particularly unfair. For example, the 
public may perceive Alford pleas to be more illegitimate than 
conventional pleas, and, significantly, the instrumental benefits of 
the pleas are comparatively less clear-cut. Specifically, Alford pleas 
are said to contribute to expeditious case processing and to provide a 
mechanism for innocent defendants to avail themselves rationally of 
the advantages of bargaining, but the pleas may concurrently 
274. Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 237-38 (2005); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). 
275. c:'[. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2009) (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
276. Cf. United States v. Davidson, 367 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1966); Pope v. 
United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1961). 
277. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. 
278. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970); FEF.LEY, supra note 116, at 27-28 (discussing 
plea bargaining as a means to achieve substantively just results); HEUMANN, 
supra note 116; Frank E. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 
YALE. L.J. 1969, 1976 ("Why is liberty too important to be left to the defendant 
whose life is at stake? Should we not say instead that liberty is too important 
to deny effect to the defendant's choice?"). 
279. See, e.g., Davidson, 367 F.2d 60; Pope, 298 F.2d 507; George Fisher, 
Plea-Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 864-68 (2000) (tracing history of 
plea bargaining as a response to docket pressure). 
280. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 122, at 1369-70; O'Hear, supra note 114, at 
409. 
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facilitate wrongful convictions and thereby undermine the systemic 
search for truth.281 Another potential area for reform involves 
cooperation agreements, which are intended to serve crime-control 
objectives by permitting law enforcement to penetrate the upper 
echelons of criminal syndicates, but which may lead not to the 
capture of big fish but only to the capture of bigger schools of small 
fish.282 Finally, many jurisdictions prohibit judicial involvement 
with plea bargaining,zss notwithstanding findings showing that 
people perceive plea bargaining to be more legitimate the more it 
comes to resemble mediation.284 On the one hand, such bars to 
judicial participation may promote neutrality in the supervision of 
guilty pleas (or trials in the unlikely event the parties fail to 
consummate pleas).2Rfi On the other hand, judicial participation 
may check prosecutors who may use superior bargaining power to 
leverage inequitable pleas. In short, plea bargaining is no one-
dimensional practice, and, accordingly, perceptions of legitimacy 
may have a lot to say about discrete aspects, even if the practice is-
as it were-too big to fail. 
C. Liability and Punishment Rules 
Some deviations from community views of justice may reflect 
simply a failure to understand those views. Serious empirical 
research on the issue is relatively recent.286 However, in many other 
instances, an admitted deviation from empirical desert is justified 
by some specific interest that it advances. Below we consider two 
sorts of justifications: first, rules whose drafters acknowledge the 
value of a desert distribution but who argue that, given the 
complexities of the real world, that desert goal is sometimes best 
achieved by adopting a legal rule that on its face may not seem to 
put desert first; second, rules that openly reject desert in favor of 
some other interest, including reducing future crime, or promoting 
an interest unrelated to criminal justice, such as assisting 
international diplomacy possibly by providing immunity to 
281. See generally Bibas, supra note 122 (condemning Alford pleas). 
282. Safer & Crowl, supra note 125, at 44. 
283. I'v1ARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 390 (2d 
ed. 2005) (noting that more than half of the states and the federal system 
instruct the judge not to "participate" in the plea discussions); see also FED. R. 
CRIM. P. ll(c)(l). 
284. Sergio Herzog, Plea-Bargaining Practices: Less Covert, More Public 
Support?, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 590, 606 (2004). 
285. See, e.g., State v. Bouie, 817 So. 2d 48, 55 (La. 2002) (holding that a 
judge could warn a defendant about consequences of conviction, but his express 
opinion on date of trial that conviction was "all but a foregone conclusion" 
constituted sufficient coercion to render the plea involuntary). 
286. Note the publication dates on the many studies cited supra Part ILB. 
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diplomats. Consider the deviations from desert reported and 
documented by Robinson and CahilJ.287 
Some deviations from desert are adopted out of fear that a more 
desert-based rule would be subject to easy manipulation and abuse, 
and thus would produce less justice, not more.zss Rules of this sort 
include the criminal law's near-universal common rejection of a 
reasonable mistake of law defense, and the rejection of an insanity 
defense by some states and limitations on its availability in other 
states.zsg It also is common for states to ignore the individual 
characteristics of a defendant in making liability judgments, as in 
judging provocation or negligence, including ignoring the person's 
incapacities that make it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to 
have avoided the violation.290 
A deviation rule also may be adopted because a more desert-
based rule would encounter evidentiary problems, which would 
reduce the reliability of the process. For example, statutes of 
limitation were adopted to avoid the dangers of stale evidence.291 
Strict liability is imposed in cases where culpability is likely to exist 
but may be difficult to prove.292 And coerced confessions and 
uncounseled lineups are excluded to avoid false recriminations. 
Another reason for a rule that on its face would seem to promote 
failures of justice is its tendency to promote justice in many other 
cases, often cases seen as more important, where the failure of 
justice would be more outrageous. Plea bargains and witness 
immunity are examples. They may be granted for quite serious 
287. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY 
THE LAW DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE chs. 2-8 (2006) [hereinafter 
LWJ]. 
288. For a general discussion, see id. at 22-88. 
289. See, e.g., MODEL PF.NAL CODE § 2.04(3) (1985) (disallowing mistake of 
law as a defense to prosecution outside of two very narrow exceptions); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2004) ("Mental condition shall not be a defense to any 
charge of criminal conduct."); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770-71 (2006) 
(upholding Arizona's insanity defense statute allowing evidence of mental 
illness, which prevents the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's 
action, but disallowing evidence that mental illness prevented one from forming 
the mens rea required for the crime). 
290. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985) (defining negligence as 
a "gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the actor's situation"). 
291. See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 
AM. CRJM. L. REV. 115, 115-16 (2008) (describing the purposes of statutes of 
limitations as "protect[ing] individuals from having to defend themselves 
against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage 
of time ... encouraging government agents promptly to investigate suspected 
criminal activity"). 
292. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, DEPAUL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (describing one advantage of strict liability as avoiding the 
often costly and time-consuming task of proving negligence). 
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offenses if the cooperation thereby gained will allow the successful 
prosecution of even more serious offenses by others. 
These deviation rules do risk undermining the system's moral 
credibility, and they ought to be maintained only if there is no other, 
nondcviation means of achieving the objective. A careful review of 
these rules and their effects may suggest that not all are fully 
justified in their present form. Nonetheless, some of these deviation 
doctrines will stand up to that scrutiny because they really do 
promote justice.293 Good intentions count a good deal in setting 
reputation, so it would be worthwhile for the criminal justice system 
to make clear its desert-based rationales in adopting doctrines that 
appear to deviate from desert. It can be important to the system's 
moral credibility that it is in any case trying to do justice as best it 
can in a complex world. 
Other doctrines that deviate from desert do openly sacrifice 
desert, typically to pursue some other interest thought to be 
important. Most obvious are the doctrines distributing criminal 
liability and punishment to optimize general deterrence or 
incapacitation of the dangerous, which deviate from desert to 
advance those traditional coercive crime-control programs.294 
General deterrence may present crime-control opportunities 
because of its potential to affect an entire population of potential 
offenders. The deviation from desert in a single case or a small 
group of cases might be enough to send an effective deterrent 
message to a very large group of potential offenders. On the other 
hand, as one of us has shown elsewhere,295 it is likely that one or 
more of the prerequisites for a deterrent effect will be missing, 
thereby subverting the possibility of such striking gains. 
A deterrence-based rule can have no effect unless the target 
audience knows of the rule, directly or indirectly, yet the studies 
show that such knowledge of legal rules is weak, even among those 
who have special reasons to learn those rules. Further, even if the 
target knows of the rule, a rule can have no effect unless the target 
is a rational calculator who can and will choose to act in his rational 
self-interests. Yet the majority of the people most likely to need the 
coercive deterrent threat are not such rational calculators. Finally, 
even if the target knows the rule and is a rational calculator, he will 
not be deterred unless his rational calculations lead him to believe 
that the risk of committing the offense outweighs its benefits. Yet, 
293. For a more detailed account of deviations from empirical desert that 
might be tolerated, see ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at ch. 
12. 
294. For a general discussion, see LWJ, tsupra note 281, at 117-36. 
295. See, e.g., ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PK1NCIPLES, supra note 3, at chs. 3-4; 
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural 
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004); Paul H. Robinson 
& ,John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law 
Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003). 
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again, the data suggests that the low conviction rates that exist for 
almost all offenses make the risk of punishment in most situations 
sufficiently low that most targets will ignore it. Having a criminal 
justice system will deter, but manipulating liability and punishment 
rules within that system will work only in the atypical cases in 
which all three of these prerequisites to effective deterrence will be 
satisfied. 
Add to this the fact that there is already a deterrent threat 
inherent in just punishment; deterrence-based rules can do better 
than desert-based rules only in those cases in wh1ch the former 
deviate from desert-do injustice or cause a failure of justice-yet it 
is in just these deviation cases that the deterrence program is at its 
weakest. People assume the law is as they think it should be-
which they think is a desert-based rule-hence they will know of a 
different, deterrence-based rule only if the system has undertaken a 
special education campaign. And it is in these deviation-from-desert 
cases in which people----<:itizens, jurors, witnesses, police, 
prosecutors, and judges-are most likely to subvert and resist the 
system rather than to help it. 
Indeed, it does not follow that a deviation from desert is 
justified even in those instances in which the deterrence 
prerequisites are satisfied. A deviation is justified only if the 
general deterrent effect would be so great as to outweigh even the 
long-term detriment to the criminal justice system's moral 
credibility from such a deliberate choice to do injustice or to fail to 
do justice. Even a single well-publicized case that conflicts with 
community intuitions of justice (and recall that well-publicized cases 
are often the most useful for general deterrence) can have a serious 
detrimental effect on the criminal justice system's reputation 
because the deliberateness of the deviation reveals the system's lack 
of full commitment to doing justice. 
Because incapacitation of the dangerous is so effective at 
preventing future crimes by the individual offenders detained, it 
may present substantial crime-control opportunities. But it is not 
necessarily true that those opportunities will regularly justify 
deviation from desert. First, of course, such deviations undermine 
the criminal law's moral credibility. But beyond that, such 
preventive detention faces other hurdles. The cost of a deviation 
from desert can be justified only if its crime control cannot be 
achieved through nondeviation means. In this instance, the 
possibility for civil preventive detention of dangerous persons means 
that incapacitation cannot justify undermining the moral credibility 
of the criminal justice system. And, as one of us has argued 
elsewhere, such an open civil preventive system is likely to be both 
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fairer to detainees and more protective and less costly for the 
community.296 
Beyond these crime-control interests of general deterrence and 
incapacitation, other criminal justice related interests are also 
offered as justification for deviations. As Parts II.A and III.A make 
clear, fairness in reaching a result, not just the justness of the 
result, can be important to society. At stake here is not only the 
deontological interest in fairness but also the practical interest in 
the power of legitimacy discussed previously. As Part V explains, 
the demands of fairness may suggest procedures or practices that 
tend to frustrate doing justice.297 
In preparation for Part V, let us give a few examples to 
illustrate the point. The legality principle bars conviction for offense 
conduct that was not specifically described in a previously existing 
prohibition, even if most people, including the offender, believed 
that the conduct was prohibited. The exclusionary rule may bar the 
use of clearly reliable evidence in order to discourage police from 
engaging in unauthorized searches or seizures, even if such 
exclusion lets a clearly guilty offender go free. Speedy trial rules, 
designed to discourage prosecutorial delay, can have a similar effect. 
The bar against "double jeopardy" operates to limit prosecutorial 
abuse through repeated prosecutions, even if it means the clearly 
guilty will escape the punishment they deserve. The entrapment 
defense, which is designed to discourage overzealous police, can give 
a defense even if the offender is a career criminal looking for an 
opportunity to commit the offense. Like the exclusionary rule, the 
entrapment defense, especially the objective police-misconduct 
formulation of it as appears in the Code,298 seeks to control police 
overreaching. 
Still other deviation rules are justified on grounds unrelated to 
the criminal justice system,299 as with diplomatic and official 
immunity, which are said to promote international interchange and 
governmental independence, respectively. Similarly, non-criminal-
justice interests are being advanced when the unique condemnatory 
power of criminal conviction is used to boost the prohibition of minor 
regulatory violations. 
Each of these deviation rules may have some justification, but 
there is also reason to believe that each incurs a cost to the criminal 
justice system by undermining its moral credibility. The 
detrimental effects of such reduction in moral credibility suggests 
that each deviation rule merits reevaluation to determine whether 
296. See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at ch. 6; Paul H. 
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal 
Justice, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1429 (2001). 
297. For a general discussion, see LWJ, supra note 281, at 89-116, 137-85. 
298. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.13 (1985). 
299. For a general discussion, see LWJ, supra note 281, at 186--204. 
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its benefits outweigh its costs and whether the same benefits might 
be as effectively produced by a nondeviation means. 
V. THE OCCASIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND 
MORAL CREDIBILITY 
The previous discussions have made clear that perceptions of 
fairness in enforcement and adjudication are distinct from and 
independent of perceptions of justice in the distribution of liability 
and punishment. This is not to say that the two dynamics-
legitimacy and moral credibility-are unrelated. To the contrary, 
they are often 'mutually reinforcing.3oo Significantly, however, they 
are not always symbiotic. A procedurally fair system may generate 
seriously unjust results, and a procedurally unfair system may 
nonetheless produce just results. In short, the police practices, 
criminal adjudication procedures, and criminal liability rules within 
a jurisdiction may be in very different states. More importantly for 
our purposes, not only is it possible for fair practices and procedures 
and just punishment to be on different tracks, but sometimes they 
are on a collision course. Specifically, practices and procedures that 
advance fairness sometimes can undermine justice. And 
enforcement practices and adjudication procedures that would most 
effectively advance justice may be seen as unfair. 
A. Points of Tension 
Consider, for example, such stalwarts of the American criminal 
justice system as the prohibition against allowing prosecutors to rely 
on illegally seized evidence, retry acquitted defendants, or delay 
trials as best suits effective prosecution. The rights against double 
jeopardy and to a speedy trial, as well as the exclusionary rule, all 
have been constitutionally enshrined to some extent. Yet it may 
well be that the virtues that drive these procedural rules are not 
accuracy in truth finding or reliability in doing justice. On the 
contrary, each of these rules, and many others, can easily frustrate 
justice. 301 
The exclusionary rule can exclude reliable evidence that allows 
the perpetrator of even a serious offense to go free, a result that 
300. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler et al., Armed and Dangerous(?): Motivating Rule 
Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 457 (2007) 
(observing that the implementation of fair procedures reinforces the perception 
that the system shares and honors the public's moral values). 
301. See, for example, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976), where the 
constitutional rules prohibited the government from using silence as evidence of 
guilt. See also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (''The illogic of the [rule] is plain, for it runs exactly counter to 
normal evidentiary inferences: If I ask my son whether he saw a movie I had 
forbidden him to watch, and he remains silent, the import of his silence is 
clear."). See generally LWJ, supra note 281 (cataloguing the variety of 
justifications for and the doctrines used in deviating from desert). 
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cannot help but draw the criminal justice system into disrepute, at 
least with regard to its commitment for doing justice. In the case of 
Larry Eyler, for example, police suspected Eyler of a string of 
gruesome killings of young gay men. When a state trooper just 
happened upon Eyler parked on the side of the highway preparing 
for another kill of a young hitchhiker, he became suspicious, called 
headquarters and heard of prior suspicions, and took Eyler to the 
station, probably saving the hitchhiker's life. A search of Eyler's 
vehicle turned up conclusive proof of his previous crimes, but the 
court excluded the evidence because the search was unlawfuJ.302 
Eyler was released to kill again, and indeed did so before 
subsequently being captured and convicted for the later crime.303 
Many may wonder whether this frustration of justice, together with 
its high cost in human life, is worth the benefits that the 
exclusionary rule offers. 
The double jeopardy bar may present a similar situation. In the 
case of Melvin Ignatow, for example, Brenda Schaefer was brutally 
raped, tortured, and killed by lgnatow and his former girlfriend. At 
trial, the girlfriend testified for the prosecution but came off as an 
unreliable witness, and Ignatow simply lied his way to reasonable 
doubt. He was acquitted. Ten months later, as the new owners of 
Ignatow's former house were putting down new carpeting, they 
found film taped inside a floor duct. When the film was developed, it 
provided a grisly record of Ignatow's horrendous offense, yet 
Ignatow could not be retried for the murder. 304 Again, this gross 
failure of justice is likely to undermine in many peoples' minds the 
system's commitment to doing justice.305 
302. John Conroy, The Return of Larry Eyler, CHI. READER (July 30, 1992), 
available at http://www .chicagoreader .com/chicago/the-return -of-larry -ey ler 
/Content?oid=880169. · 
303. LWJ, supra note 281, at 139-49, 157-59. 
304. Id. at 159-66. 
305. For example, when law students are asked to judge what, if any, 
liability and punishment lgnatow deserves, 100% impose liability, with a mean 
and a mode of life imprisonment; 







3 years 1% 
7 years 1% 




Liability but no punishment 10% 
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Or imagine that an Eyler or an Ignatow is released because of a 
speedy trial violation, a statute of limitations has run, or the text of 
an offense statute was ambiguous (even though the defendant knew 
his conduct was wrong).306 The fairness interests may be clear-
speedy trial rights, statutes of limitations, and the legality principle 
are common and well established-but the justice costs can be 
significant. 
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to insist on adhering to the 
conventional standards and rules that are premised on fairness 
concerns. First, and obviously, fairness is an important value in 
itself. But there are practical crime-control reasons beyond this, as 
Parts ILA and III.A have shown. But one can say more. For 
example, the system's adherence to these fairness rules, even in 
such costly cases, advertises the extent of its commitment to them. 
Indeed, it is the costs of undermining justice in discrete cases that 
may do the most to advertise just how devoted the system is to these 
fairness interests. If the system is willing to follow such rules, even 
when they undermine justice in such egregious cases, the message 
says, then citizens can have confidence that the rules certainly will 
be followed in the more common, less egregious cases. That 
demonstration of high commitment enhances the system's 
legitimacy, with its consequent benefits of greater deference and 
compliance. 
However, one can imagine ways in which a society might strike 
a different balance between fairness and justice on these, and other, 
issues. A system might limit application of the rules, perhaps by 
applying them less rigorously in cases of serious offenses, as some 
have suggested.307 Or a system might shift to alternative 
procedures that could effectively advance fairness interests without 
jeopardizing justice-for example, by replacing the exclusionary rule 
with a robust civil-compensation or administrative-disciplinary 
regime that could punish police for unlawful searches of any 
individual (and not just for unlawful searches of accused 
offenders).308 Or a system might narrow application of rules and 
standards in circumstances where the threat of injustice is high, but 
the threat of unfairness is low. For example, the system might bar 
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSTRS, TEACHER'S 
MANUAL (2d ed. 2008). 
306. See, e.g., Keeler v. Super. Ct. of Amador Cnty., 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) 
(reversing murder conviction where statute did not unambiguously cover killing 
of fetus); Billingslea v. State, 780 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (reversing 
abuse conviction where code did not provide adult :son with duty to care for 
elderly disabled mother who was living in his home). 
307. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) ("If ... the 
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use 
in the instant situation is unwarranted."). 
308. See, e.g., LWJ, supra note 281, at 149-55. 
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application of double jeopardy when a defendant's deceptive conduct 
helped generate the original acquittal.309 
B. Resolving the Conflict 
As the last Subpart demonstrates, although a system should 
strive to realize both values, this may not always be possible. 
Specifically, in the previous Subpart, we explored tensions between 
legitimacy and moral credibility and identified a number of discrete 
rules and standards-the exclusionary rule, speedy trial guarantees, 
and protections against double jeopardy-that may be defensible on 
fairness grounds even where they promote injustice. More 
generally, the question arises: Which objective is superior where a 
system might achieve only one? We can look at this question in 
either of two ways. We can attempt to resolve the deontological 
tensions between fairness and justice generally, which is the larger 
debate that takes up a noticeable part of moral philosophy, criminal 
procedure, and criminal law theory scholarship. Or we can attempt 
to resolve the narrower question of which value ought to be 
preferred where the goal is gaining deference to and compliance 
with the criminal justice system. For most of this Article, our focus 
has been on the narrow question, but, significantly, our answer 
would generally be the same under either perspective: although 
legitimacy may be the superior value in discrete circumstances (as 
discussed above and below), moral credibility is more often to be 
preferred in unfortunate circumstances where a system may 
optimize only one. 
Overall, Tyler seems to concede that moral credibility has a 
much greater effect in shaping compliance than does legitimacy,310 
but no doubt the answer is more complex than to always prefer 
moral credibility. It may depend on the setting. In different 
contexts, one or the other justification carries potentially greater 
normative force. For instance, in the order-maintenance policing 
context, the state cannot rely on moral credibility because many of 
the governing laws are borderline regulatory public-order crimes 
that lack inherent normative punch.311 Instead, legitimacy is the 
sole source of genuine normative power. In fact, legitimacy may be 
the sole effective source of any power because traditional carrots and 
sticks are particularly insufficient for deterring commonplace 
borderline crime. Police must necessarily be selective because 
309. See, e.g., id. at 16-68. 
310. Tyler reports the relative weight of the factors shaping compliance with 
the law as: morality 0.33, legitimacy 0.11, deterrence 0.02. TYLER, WPOL, 
supra note 1, at 59. 
311. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1894 
(2000) ("The more 'crime' includes things only a slight majority of the 
population thinks is bad, the harder it is to sell the idea that 'criminal' is a label 
that only attaches to very bad people."); Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law 
Care?, supra note 3, at 1865 n.84. 
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offenses of this kind are typically so prevalent.312 This creates a 
further complication: selective enforcement may feed perceptions of 
bias and illegitimacy, which may generate more disobedience, which 
may lead to even more selective enforcement, which may further 
feed perceptions of illegitimacy.313 The situation is delicate and 
potentially counterproductive. Procedural fairness is left alone to do 
the heavy lifting without the backstops of moral credibility and 
instrumental deterrence, and the enforcement process, if perceived 
to be unfair, may succeed only in making the load heavier.314 If 
nothing else, the potential for a negative feedback loop provides yet 
another powerful reason to reconsider the degree to which we rely 
on the criminal law to achieve regulatory ends.315 
Comparatively, when it comes to mala in se crimes, even if the 
public were to perceive legal authorities to be somewhat illegitimate, 
and even if an instrumental approach were unable to deter the 
rational bad actor, ordinary individuals would still tend to comply 
for the simple reason that ordinary individuals are not, in the main, 
bad actors. They obey murder statutes and cooperate with murder 
investigations and prosecutions (discounting, of course, fears of 
reprisal) because their moral aversion to homicide is that strong.316 
With serious mala in se crimes, moral credibility alone may prove 
somewhat effective, even with low levels of legitimate (or even much 
of any) enforcement.317 
In sum, procedural fairness 1s more important to the 
enforcement of regulatory crime, while moral credibility is more 
important to the enforcement of conventional crime. This may be 
reason alone to emphasize moral credibility over legitimacy (in the 
event that a criminal justice system were competent to emphasize 
only one) because moral credibility operates best within the 
traditional criminal law domain of mala in se offenses, while 
312. Tyler, supra note 13, at 312 (noting that in circumstances where there 
is "insufficient risk to motivate compliance ... the legal system benefits when 
people voluntarily defer to regulations ... even when they do not anticipate 
being caught"). 
313. Bowers, supra note 76, at 91 (noting that the law's '"normative punch' is 
weakened when communities identify with criminals over the police and view 
enforcement as 'oppressive and discriminatory,' rather than 'stigmatizing"'). 
314. Stuntz, supra note 305, at 1879--80 (focusing on how criminalizing and 
criminally enforcing vice crimes may prove counter-productive). 
315. LWJ, supra note 281, at 186-95. 
316. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care?, supra note 3, at 1865 n.84 
("As a matter of common sense, the law's moral credibility is not needed to tell a 
person that murder, rape, and robbery is wrong."); 2 JA..llviES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 
A HlSTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883) ("No one in this country 
regards, murder, rape, arson, robbery, theft, or the like, with any feeling but 
detestation. I do not think it admits of any doubt that law and morals 
powerfully support and greatly intensify each other in this matter."). 
317. Stuntz, supra note 305, at 1871 ("The mass of the population avoids 
seriously bad behavior not because they know it can be found in the codes, but 
because they know the behavior is thought to be seriously bad."). 
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legitimacy operates best in only regulatory domains in which state 
objectives might be achieved equally or nearly as well through civil 
law or other means. 318 
The question comes down to which concept ultimately provides 
a better screen. For a number of reasons, we believe that moral 
credibility should be expected to more effectively motivate optimal 
deference. First, moral credibility entails a concrete assessment of 
the substantive law or enforcement effort at hand. Legitimacy, by 
contrast, entails institutional analyses that operate at higher levels 
of abstraction. To produce deference, then, legitimacy is mediated 
by a cognitive move: the prospective offender must contemplate 
illegal conduct, then consider what she thinks of the set of 
procedures used to enforce it, and then decide whether to engage in 
the forbidden conduct based on her feelings-not toward the law 
itself-but toward the system that prescribes it. For moral 
credibility to produce deference, the prospective offender need only 
contemplate the i11egal conduct and then consider what she thinks of 
that conduct. The questions are discrete and coherent: Should I 
comply with this law? Is this law morally justified? Should I 
cooperate with this prosecution? Is this prosecution morally 
justified? We expect that an individual is likelier to refrain from 
behavior that she finds immoral than from behavior that she deems 
neither right nor wrong but that just so happens to be proscribed by 
legitimate authority.319 As Sarah Lawsky has observed: 
"[A]ssessments of distributive justice might lead to compliance (or 
noncompliance) directly, without being mediated by an increased 
belief in legitimacy."320 Indeed, studies have shown that "whereas 
assessments of procedural justice tend to influence views and 
beliefs ... assessments of distributive justice tend to influence 
behavior ."321 
Second, moral judgments are innately comprehensible. We are 
all social beings with moral compasses that we instinctively 
consult.322 We require no auxiliary understanding to access 
318. Indeed, the amorality of many regulatory offenses invites the first-order 
question of whether the underlying malum prohibitum conduct should be 
criminalized in the first instance. LWJ, supra note 281, at 186-95. 
319. See Linda Skitka, Christopher Bauman & Brad Lytle, The Limits of 
Legitimacy: Morality as a Constraint on Deference to Authority, Presentation to 
22nd Ann. IACM Conf. (.June 15, 2009) (transcript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=1493520. But cf. Jaime 
Napier & Tom. R. Tyler, Does Moral Conviction Really Override Concerns About 
Procedural Justice? A Reexamination of the Value Protection Model, 21 Soc. 
JUST. RES. 509, 513 (2008) Craising conceptual and empirical concerns with 
Skitka's research). 
320. Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited 
Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 184 (2008). 
321. Id. 
322. Nadler, supra note 210; Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra 
note 3, at 4. 
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perceptions of just deserts. But we must achieve a certain level of 
socialization for legitimacy to do its work. We must grasp the 
objectives, structure, and methods of a justice system and the 
implications of its procedural practices and strategic choices. For 
this reason, perceptions of moral credibility are not just easier to 
tap, they are likelier to be right. Fewer external variables cloud our 
moral valuations. By contrast, perceptions of legitimacy may fail to 
reflect reality in fact because these perceptions may be based on 
incomplete or inaccurate information about supplementary matters 
of enforcement and adjudication. Indeed, the fact that perceptions 
of procedural fairness rely on more than intuition may explain the 
somewhat greater dissensus that we think we see on questions of 
procedural as opposed to distributive justice.323 
Third, legitimacy is an umbrella concept that covers everything 
from discourteous to discriminatory behavior. And even if we lack a 
comprehensive rank ordering of legitimacy criteria, it simply stands 
to reason that mere rudeness is less likely to undermine deference 
than perceived immorality. 
Fourth, perceptions of procedural fairness are more likely to be 
socially constructed than perceptions of substantive justice. 
Therefore, the corrupt state may more easily manipulate the 
legitimacy project to serve its bad ends, as we detail below. 
Thus, we land in a somewhat different place than Tyler and 
Darley. They emphasized legitimacy over moral credibility, arguing 
that perceptions of procedural fairness are superior because they are 
more global and thus have the potential to provide legal authorities 
with broad discretionary power. Legitimacy provides greater and 
more reliable authority to legal officials than does morality, because 
legal officials have discretionary authority to decide what is 
appropriate. Within the scope of their prescribed roles, the police 
and courts make decisions, and citizens believe that they ought to 
obey those decisions. Because legitimacy invests authorities with 
discretionary authority, it is a more flexible form of social value 
upon which to base the operation of the legal system. "With 
morality, the discretion rests with citizens, who decide whether or 
not the law corresponds to their moral values."324 
Moral credibility, by contrast, asks only the narrow question of 
what the public thinks of a particular law (or at most a particular 
323. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 35, at 1892; see also supra notes 29, 
54, 75-92 and accompanying text (exploring dissensus over the legitimacy of 
certain procedures). But, of course, this is an empirical clai.m that demands 
further study. 
324. Tyler & Darley, supra note 1, at 723; see also TYLER, WPOL, supra note 
1, at 4 ("Although both morality and legitimacy are normative, they are not 
identical. Leaders are especially interested in having legitimacy in the eyes of 
their followers, because legitimacy most effectively provides them with 
discretionary authority that they can use in governing."); supra notes 10-14 and 
accompanying text. 
282 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
application of a particular law) and thereby provides less free space 
for unconstrained decision making. In short, it provides only a one-
off check. 
But where Tyler and Darley saw a detriment to the moral-
credibility project, we see its chief virtue. Tyler and Darley may be 
right that perceptions of legitimacy provide authorities with leeway 
to make unpopular decisions that are, nevertheless, correct. 325 But 
the point presupposes that the decisions are, in fact, correct. What 
if their decisions are incorrect or, worse still, corrupt? As indicated, 
a false perception of legitimacy may motivate unwarranted 
deference, and we ought not to want the public to blindly acquiesce 
to governmental conduct simply because the state has established 
an ersatz reserve of good will or trust. Bad results may come to pass 
when the public no longer makes or acts upon specific judgments as 
to the appropriateness of discrete governmental action. 
To put a finer point on it, we might imagine two systems. First, 
in a legitimate system that has no reputation for moral credibility, 
people will obey the law uncritically because legal authorities ought 
to be obeyed, leaving unanalyzed the question of whether the law is 
itself normatively defensible law. Because police and prosecutors 
have vested interests in cultivating discretionary power, it is 
unsurprising that legal authorities should favor such a system.326 
But should the rest of us? Not if the best interests of legal 
authorities fail to align with the public interest. Second, in a 
morally credible system that has no reputation for legitimacy, 
people will be indifferent to legal authorities but will behave morally 
because it is right to behave morally. Significantly, in such 
circumstances, the public will be forever checking and rechecking 
legal measures, and may choose to defy the state should it break 
loose from its normative moorings. It is no flaw that, as Tyler 
accurately observed, "Morality can lead to compliance with laws, but 
it can also work against it."327 Rather, the individual may (and 
typically should) feel compelled to deviate from even the legitimate 
system that tries to implement and enforce an isolated unjust or 
immoral liability or punishment rule. We should want the system to 
cultivate deference for its morally laden directives. We may even 
want the system to cultivate deference for its amoral or morally 
ambiguous directives. But we should not want the system to 
cultivate deference for its immoral directives. 
325. Tyler & Darley, supra note 1, at 723 ("The legitimacy of authorities is 
an especially promising basis for the rule of law, because research suggests that 
it is not linked to agreement with the decisions made by legal 
authorities .... [L]egal authorities ... are required to make unpopular 
decisions, which may deliver unfavorable outcomes."). 
326. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 4. 
327. Id. (discussing resistance and acquiescence to the Vietnam conflict); see 
supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, we think that, descriptively, moral intuitions pack more 
punch, and, normatively, this is as it should be.328 
CONCLUSION 
A growing literature on procedural fairness suggests that there 
is practical value in enhancing a criminal justice system's 
"legitimacy" with the community. A separate literature suggests 
that there is practical value in enhancing the system's "moral 
credibility" with the community it governs by distributing criminal 
liability and punishment according to principles that track the 
community's shared intuitions of justice. In this Article, we have 
examined the shared aims and the similarities in the operation and 
effect of these two criminal justice dynamics as well as their 
occasional differences in effect and their potential for conflict. 
Among other things, we have concluded that the normative 
influences of the two dynamics are indeed similar, and that they 
may be mutually reinforcing. On the other hand, the extent of our 
knowledge about the two dynamics is different. While the 
"legitimacy" dynamic is the better known, and is more frequently 
used as a justification by scholars, we know less about what 
practices and procedures will produce legitimacy than we do about 
what liability and punishment rules will produce moral credibility. 
Similarly, at present, there is less empirical support for the claimed 
beneficial practical effects of legitimacy in producing deference and 
compliance than there is for moral credibility doing the same. 
While the benefits of pe1·ceived legitimacy and moral credibility 
go beyond the deontological to include the practical benefits of 
advancing effective crime control, it is also true that plausible and 
good-faith arguments, generally utilitarian in nature, can be made 
in support of practices, procedures, or rules that are perceived as 
unfair or unjust. However, we argue that a system should deviate 
from the community's notions of fairness and justice only when: 
first, that deviation achieves a goal that cannot be achieved through 
nondeviation means; and, second, the crime-control benefits of the 
deviation outweigh the crime-control costs inherent in undermining 
the system's legitimacy and moral credibility. 
Finally, we have shown that sometimes there is even tension 
between the dynamics of legitimacy and moral credibility, as with 
such doctrines as double jeopardy, the exclusionary rule, speedy 
trial, and the legality principle. While the effect of moral credibility 
in producing cooperation and deference may be greater than that of 
legitimacy, the choice between the two is more complex, commonly 
dependent upon context. Sometimes, legitimacy is to be prioritized. 
More often, we think moral credibility is the superior value. 
Happily, it is typically the case that legitimacy and moral credibility 
328. See Skitka et al., supra note 313. 
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work together to support one another in harnessing the powerful 
forces of social and normative influence in gaining deference and 
compliance. 
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